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Abstract
Unconventional computing is about breaking boundaries in thinking, act-
ing and computing. Typical topics of this non-typical field include, but are













not limited to physics of computation, non-classical logics, new complexity
measures, novel hardware, mechanical, chemical and quantum computing.
Unconventional computing encourages a new style of thinking while practi-
cal applications are obtained from uncovering and exploiting principles and
mechanisms of information processing in and functional properties of, phys-
ical, chemical and living systems; in particular, efficient algorithms are de-
veloped, (almost) optimal architectures are designed and working prototypes
of future computing devices are manufactured. This article includes idiosyn-
cratic accounts of ‘unconventional computing’ scientists reflecting on their
personal experiences, what attracted them to the field, their inspirations and
discoveries.
Keywords: Unconventional computing, East, West, spirituality
1. Introduction
The term ‘unconventional computing’ has no exact definition. Proceeding
by inclusiveness we could say that the following research topics are most com-
monly, but not necessarily, classified as ‘unconventional’: physics of computa-
tion (e.g. conservative logic, thermodynamics of computation, reversible com-
puting, quantum computing, collision-based computing with solitons, optical
logic); chemical computing (e.g. implementation of logical functions in chem-
ical systems, image processing and pattern recognition in reaction-diffusion
chemical systems and networks of chemical reactors); bio-molecular comput-
ing (e.g. conformation based, information processing in molecular arrays,
molecular memory); cellular automata as models of massively parallel com-
puting complexity (e.g. computational complexity of non-standard computer
architectures; theory of amorphous computing; artificial chemistry); non-
classical logics (e.g. logical systems derived from space-time behaviour of nat-
ural systems, logical reasoning in physical, chemical and biological systems);
smart actuators (e.g. molecular machines incorporating information process-
ing, intelligent arrays of actuators); novel hardware systems (e.g. cellular
automata VLSIs, functional neural chips); mechanical computing (e.g. mi-
cromechanical encryption, computing in nanomachines, physical limits to
mechanical computation).
There are two discipline-wise paths to unconventional computing. First,
you are initially trained as mathematician or computer scientist, then you














find yourself outside the well establish tracks. Second, more common, you
are trained as chemist, biologist, physicist, then you got involved in compu-
tation and got eager to understand the meaning of information and computa-
tion in natural systems, and subsequently start realising computing devices
in novel substrates. Following the overall goals of this special issue we have
aimed to represent a mosaic of snapshots of personal, scientific, spiritual and
philosophical experiences of scientists working in the field of unconventional
computing. We did not try to answer the question “How?” each of one
of them got into the field but rather “Why?” they found themselves do-
ing unconventional computing. Some authors did not even answer “‘Why?”
because no answer may exist.
To make the compendium of ‘paths towards unconventional’ representa-
tive we have invited authors with backgrounds in different fields of science,
various stages of their academic career, and from a wide geographic distri-
bution. They are Cristian S. Calude (Sect. 4), who excels in computability
and algorithmic and quantum randomness and was the first to propose the
‘unconventional computation; Selim Akl (Sect. 5), who is amongst the fa-
thers of parallel computation, especially sorting, quantum computing, and
non-universality; Kenichi Morita (Sect. 2), the guru of reversibility and cel-
lular automata; Yukio-Pegio Gunji (Sect. 3), well known for his unorthodox
thoughts on observation and complexity; Hector Zenil (Sect. 6), a pioneer in
applications of algorithmic complexity to molecular and computational biol-
ogy; Andrew Schumann (Sect. 7), who deals with unconventional logic for
modelling behaviours; Zoran Konkoli (Sect. 8), known for his unique interdis-
ciplinary contributions to physics and metaphysics of computation; Maurice
Margenstern (Sect. 9), famous for hyperbolic cellular automata and compu-
tation; José Félix Costa (Sect. 10), excelling in physics and logic of computa-
tion; Mark Burgin (Sect. 11), who has advanced super-recursive algorithms,
axiomatic complexity and inductive Turing machines; Andrew Adamatzky
(Sect. 12), who has designed a range of weird prototypes of unconventional
computing devices; Mohammad M. Dehsibi (Sect. 13), who has discovered
trends in evolving complexity of Persian language; Richard Mayne (Sect. 14),
who has advanced bio-medical foundations of computing; Bruno Marchal
(Sect. 15), who has advanced foundations of the physical sciences and the
mind-body problem; Yaroslav D. Sergeyev (Sect. 16), who founded the field
of numerical computing with infinities and infinitesimals having many appli-
cations and a striking importance for foundations of mathematics; Karl Svozil














fascinated by the metaphysical debate on (in)determinism; Genaro Martinez
(Sect. 18), cellular automata guru; Georgios Ch. Sirakoulis (Sect. 19), an
unconventional hardware engineer; Bruce MacLennan (Sect. 20), a prophet
of continuous computing; Susan Stepney (Sect. 21), who is making computer
science a natural science.
2. Kenichi Morita: Unconventional Knowledge
Distinguishing between “conventional computing” and “unconventional
computing” is not so easy, since the notion of unconventional computing is
rather vague. Some scientist may want to give a rigorous definition of it.
But, if he or she does so, then unconventional computing will become less
attractive. The very vagueness of the concept stimulates one’s imagination,
and thus is a source of creation.
In this short essay, related to such a problem, we consider thinking styles
of the West and the East. We examine several possibilities of ways by which
we can recognize various concepts in the world, and acquire enlightenment
from the nature. At first, we begin with the two categories of knowledge
in Buddhism. They are “discriminative knowledge” and “non-discriminative
knowledge” (however, as we shall see below, discrimination between “dis-
criminative knowledge” and “non-discriminative knowledge” itself is not im-
portant at all in Buddhism). Although it is very difficult to explain them,
in particular non-discriminative knowledge, by words, here we dare to give
some considerations on them.
Discriminative knowledge is just the set-theoretic one. Namely, it is a
knowledge acquired by classifying things existing in the world. For example,
the discriminative knowledge on “cat” is obtained by distinguishing the ob-
jects that are cats from the objects that are not cats. Therefore, what we
can argue based on discriminative knowledge is a relation among the sets
corresponding to various concepts, e.g., the set of cats is contained in the
sets of animals, and so on. Knowledge described by an ordinary language (or
a mathematical language like a logic formula) is of this kind, since “words”
basically have a function to distinguish certain things from others.
Non-discriminative knowledge, on the other hand, is regarded as the true
wisdom in Buddhism. But, it is very difficult to explain it in words, since
words can be used for describing discriminative knowledge. Therefore, the














“Non-discriminative knowledge is not a knowledge that is obtained by distin-
guishing certain things from others.” Actually, non-discriminative knowledge
is recognized neither by words, nor by thinking, nor by act. Moreover, it is
not even recognizable. This is because all acts such as recognizing, thinking,
and explaining some objects necessarily accompany discrimination between
the self (i.e., actor) and the object. In Buddhism, everything is empty, i.e.,
it has no reality in the world in its essence. Hence, there is nothing to be
discriminated, and there is a truth that can be gotten without discriminat-
ing things. Furthermore, such a truth (non-discriminative knowledge) itself
is also empty, and thus does not exist. It may sound contradictory, but this
is caused by explaining it by ordinary words.
There is no doubt that discriminative knowledge brings practical conve-
nience to our daily life. Today’s science also relies on discriminative knowl-
edge. There, objects to be studied are clearly identified, and their properties
are described precisely. By this, science brought us a great success. However,
discrimination is considered as a kind of “biased view” in Buddhism. Thus,
we should note that such a knowledge is a “relative” one. Namely, when we
state a scientific truth, we can only say like “If we assume a certain thing is
distinguishable from others based on some (biased) viewpoint, then we can
conclude so-and-so on it.” We should thus be careful not to overestimate the
descriptive power of languages.
It is well known that from the end of 19th century the foundation of
mathematics has been formalized rigorously with the utmost precision. It is,
of course, based on discriminative knowledge. However, at the same time,
problems and limitations of such a methodology were also disclosed. A para-
dox by Bertrand Russel on the set theory is the most famous one, which first
appeared in Nachwort of the Frege’s book [1]. Russel’s paradox is as follows.
Let R be the set of all sets each of which does not contain itself as a member.
Is R a member of itself or not? In either case, it contradicts the definition
of R. Due to this paradox, the naive set theory had to be replaced by some
sophisticated ones such as the type theory. The incompleteness theorem by
Kurt Gödel [2] also shows a limitation of a formal mathematical system. He
proved that in every formal system in which natural numbers can be dealt
with, there exists a “true” formula that cannot be proved in this system.
He showed it by composing a formula having the meaning “This formula is
unprovable.”
Nāgārjuna is a Buddhist priest and philosopher who lived in India around














he developed the theory of emptiness. In his book Vigrahavyāvartan̄ı (The
Dispeller of Disputes) [3], he pointed out “very logically” that false thinking
will be caused by relying only on discriminative knowledge. This book is
written in the following form. First, philosophers of other schools who believe
every concept has a substance (here, we call them philosophical realists)
present objections against those of Madhyamaka school. Then, Nāgārjuna
refutes all of them.
While philosophers of Madhyamaka school assert every concept has no
substance (but they assert “nothing” as we shall see below), the opponents
(philosophical realists) say as follows [3].
If the substance of all things is not to be found anywhere, your
assertion which is devoid of substance is not able to refute sub-
stance. (Verse 1)
Moreover, if that statement exists substantially, your earlier the-
sis is refuted. There is an inequality to be explained, and the
specific reason for this should be given. (Verse 2)
Nāgārjuna says:
If I had any thesis, that fault would apply to me. But I do not
have any thesis, so there is indeed no fault for me. (Verse 29)
To that extent, while all things are empty, completely pacified,
and by nature free from substance, from where could a thesis
come? (Commentary by Nāgārjuna on Verse 29)
That is, without saying “all things are empty,” all things are empty by nature,
and hence the Nāgārjuna’s assertion itself is also empty.
We can see that the observation “If all things are empty, then the assertion
‘all things are empty’ cannot exist” resembles the second incompleteness
theorem “If a formal system in which natural numbers can be dealt with is
consistent, then consistency of the system cannot be proved in the system”
by Gödel [2]. However, methodologies for obtaining the above observations
are quite different. In the former case, non-discriminative knowledge played
the crucial role, and thus the observation itself is again empty.
Nāgārjuna launches a counterattack against philosophical realists, who














The name “non-existent” — what is this, something existent or
again non-existent? For if it is existent or if it is nonexistent,
either way your position is deficient. (Verse 58)
It is clear that the above argument is analogous to Russel’s paradox. By
this, Nāgārjuna pointed out that philosophical realists who rely only on dis-
criminative knowledge have a logical fault. However, as stated in Verse 29,
Nāgārjuna asserts nothing in his book.
It will be reasonable to regard discriminative knowledge as conventional
knowledge. Then, how is non-discriminative knowledge? Although this kind
of knowledge has been argued by philosophers and Buddhists for a very long
time, we can say neither conventional nor unconventional. Probably, it is
meaningless to make such a distinction. Instead, we consider a question:
Can we use non-discriminative knowledge for finding a new way of scientific
thinking, and for giving a new methodology of unconventional computing?
Since current scientific knowledge is very far from non-discriminative knowl-
edge, it looks quite difficult to do so. However, it will really stimulate our
imagination, and may help us to widen the vista of unconventional comput-
ing.
I have been studying reversible computing and cellular automata [4] for
more than 30 years. Through the research on these topics, I tried to find
novel ways of computing, and thus I think they may be in the category
of unconventional computing. Besides the scientific research, I was inter-
ested in Buddhism philosophy. In 1970’s and 80’s, I read Japanese transla-
tions of several sutras and old texts of Buddhism. They are, for example,
Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra (Sutra of Perfection of Transcendent Wisdom)1, and
Vimalak̄ırti-nirdeśa Sūtra (Vimalakirti Sutra), as well as Vigrahavyāvartan̄ı
(The Dispeller of Disputes). All of them discuss emptiness of various con-
cepts and things in the world, but assert nothing. I was greatly impressed by
these arguments, which themselves are empty. Although my research results
are, of course, given in the form of discriminative knowledge, and thus in the
purely Western style, I think such a thought somehow influenced me on my
research when exploring new ways for unconventional computing.
1There are several versions of Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra that range from a very short one














3. Yukio-Pegio Gunji: Observers
Unconventional computing is the computing equipped with an endo-
observer or an internal observer (Roessler, Matsuno, Gunji). Formal logic
and/or classical and conventional computing is equipped with an exo-observer.
A substrate with an endo-observer is called “life”. That is a tradition of an-
imism in the Eastern culture.
An observer in computing is defined as an interface connecting computing
resource to the external world. If the relation between the computing resource
and the external word is uniquely determined, the interface is implemented
just as a machine. Otherwise, one is destined to find some ambiguity or
indefiniteness in the interface. That is why we generalize interface in the
form of an observer. Distinction of exo- and endo-observer is defined with
respect to where he or she stands to observe something.
An exo-observer is an observer standing at the edge of the whole per-
spective. Thus, how to manipulate an object in the perspective is uniquely
determined. Grounding an object to the external world is realized at the
edge of perspective not at the margin of each object. Imagine “1+2” in
arithmetic. The meaning of “1”, “+” and “2” is uniquely determined with-
out ambiguity. Ambiguity is nothing but character grounding to the external
world. In this sense, each symbol “1”, “+” and “2” has no ambiguity at the
margin of each symbol. Grounding has not been found till what is adapted to
the expression, “1+2”. If one counts the two coins added with one coin, the
perspective (math) in which “1+2” is well-defined is grounded to the coins in
the external world at the edge of the perspective. Similarly, if one counts two
pebbles added with one, the perspective is grounded to the external world
at the edge of arithmetic.
Writing a sentence or a poem is a kind of computing, although this a
computing with an endo-observer (i.e., unconventional computing). Imagine
a special expression, “Specially trained beetle”. One believes that one can
usually determine the meaning of the word, “specially”, “training” and “bee-
tle” without ambiguity. Therefore, one believes that the meaning of “spe-
cially trained beetle” can be determined just as the combination of meaning.
However, what is “trained beetle” and indeed, “specially”? That is an alter-
native beetle beyond beetle, featured with ominous attribute, which might
be appeared in the masterpiece of Hieronymus Bosch. That is the power of
literature and/or poetry. Why is it possible? In the strict sense, the meaning














“beetle” can be connected to what is not a beetle while “beetle” indicates
what is called a beetle. Usually the part of what is not a beetle is hidden
and cannot disappear till the special expression, “specially trained beetle”
is mentioned. Usually no one notices the part of what is not a beetle in
“beetle”, but there exists at the margin of “beetle”. Each of the words “spe-
cially”, “training” and “beetle” is linked to an external world. That is why
the outside of “specially”, of “training” and of “beetle” can be resonated to
bring about something ominous. The observer exists at the margin of each
word within the perspective of the words. That is why such observers are
endo-observers.
Replace words with some materialistic computing resource. One can
imagine unconventional computing rather than classical formal computing.
We here refer to Bob Rosens idea of life. He first mentioned complex
system. In his sense, simple system consists just of formal, efficient and
material cause. As for building a house, formal cause corresponds to a blue-
print for the design, efficient cause corresponds to works of carpenters, and
material cause corresponds to woods, nails and bricks. As for the house
building the forth cause exists, the final cause. That corresponds to someones
living. Thus, building a house is a complex system because a system is
connected to function in the open environment.
We think that the idea remains something to be revised. Note that the
final cause is the interface between a system and its environment (external
world). That is an observer. If three causes, formal, efficient and material
cause are connected to each other without ambiguity, one can find a per-
spective consisting of three causes as a definite perspective. Thus, the final
cause exists at the edge of the perspective. The former three causes can
be independently separated from the forth final cause. In this sense the fi-
nal cause at the edge of the perspective can correspond to the exo-observer.
Even if the final cause can participate in the system, the final cause can-
not contribute to other three causes within a perspective. In this sense, it
is a simple system far from living systems. Instead of it, if the relationship
among three causes, formal, efficient, and material causes cannot be uniquely
determined and can be opened to the ambiguity, one can find the connec-
tion to the external world at the margin of each cause. The connection to
the external world erodes each cause, respectively. In other words, dynamic
and indefinite relation among formal, efficient and material causes is the fi-
nal cause and endo-observer. Rosen himself introduced the idea of complex














final cause is nothing but an endo-observer. If the endo-observer is explicitly
found, then the system accompanied with an endo-observer is called a living
system. While Rosen tried to formalize living system in a category theory
to implement the final cause, as he mentioned, the map from data (material
cause) to program or function (efficient cause) is destined to have an inverse
map of it. The inverse cannot be uniquely determined and then such ambi-
guity is opened to the endo-observer. While Rosen involved indefiniteness in
formalizing life in a category theory, the indefiniteness can reveal a system
with an endo-observer.
4. Cristian S. Calude: Cooperation in Rebellion
I was always fascinated by impossibilities and mathematics. Later they
merged into mathematical impossibilities, a research topic for many years.
Impossibilities appear everywhere, from daily life to science, mathematics
and politics. Many impossibilities are just apparent. For example, it is
often claimed that having a dispassionate conversation about guns is an im-
possibility. Impossibilities in science tend to be time-dependent: renowned
physicists thought that “heavier than air” flying machines were impossible
(W. T. Kelvin), the atom bomb was impossible (E. Rutherford) and black
holes were “science fiction” (A. Einstein).
“No triangle can have two right angles” and “the square of 2 cannot be
written as a fraction with both positive integers numerator and denominator”
are mathematically proven impossibilities. They are forever, as all mathe-
matical impossibilities. Proving a mathematical impossibility is in general
more difficult than proving a positive result. For example, to prove that
a specific function f mapping natural numbers to natural numbers can be
computed by a Turing machine is enough to construct a Turing machine M
and prove that indeed M(n) computes f(n) for every n. Proving that f is
not computable by any Turing machine is a more difficult task: one has to
show that every Turing machine fails to compute f , that is, for every Turing
machine M there exists a natural m such that f(m) 6= M(m).
Below are a few of the mathematical impossibilities I have pondered over
the years.
1. The set of algorithmic random strings is not computable, in fact, it is
highly incomputable (immune) – no algorithm can “certify” more than














2. The set of reals satisfying the law of large numbers is probabilistically
“large”, but topologically “small”. Similarly, but in a constructive
(stronger) sense, the set of Martin-Löf random sequences has measure
1, but it is a meagre set in Cantor’s topology, [6].
3. In a quite general topological sense, Gödel’s incompleteness is not an
exception, but a rather common phenomenon. With respect to any
reasonable topology the set of true and unprovable statements of such a
theory is dense and in many cases even co-rare, that is “very large”, [7].
4. Every computably enumerable Martin-Löf random real is the halting
probability of a universal prefix-free Turing machine for which ZFC –
arguably the most powerful formal system for mathematics – cannot
determine more than its initial block of 1 bits – as soon as you get a 0,
it is all over, [8].
5. The halting probability ΩU of a universal prefix-free machine U is
Martin-Löf random. However, there exists a universal prefix-free ma-
chine U such that Peano Arithmetic cannot prove the randomness of
ΩU based solely on U (which fully determines ΩU), [9], [10]
Impossibilities highlight limits and with every limit comes the challenge
to trespass it. “Heavier than air” flying machines are ubiquitous, the atom
bomb was possible and its consequences have been devastating, and on 15
June 2016 the detection of a gravitational wave event from colliding black
holes was announced. In mathematics, too, limits can be transgressed. For
example, the broken symmetry between measure and category for Martin-
Löf random sequences can be restored if we use Staiger’s U δ-topology, [10],
a relativisation of the Cantor topology.
Unconventional computing is about challenging computational limits.
In 1994 John Casti and I started talking about the eventual decay of
Moore’s law and the advance of new models of computation, which we called
unconventional2. At that time there was a wide spread belief that the P
2The earliest written reference to the term which I have is from an email sent by
Seth Lloyd to John Casti Sat on 27 Jul 1996 17:12:41 in which Seth, answering an email















vs. NP problem3 will be solved in the negative before the end of the cen-
tury. This motivated the imperative need to find fast algorithms to solve NP
problems, a computational challenge unlikely, if not impossible, to succeed
using Turing machines. Another reason was the Turing barrier derived from
the Church-Turing Thesis. All computations are extensionally equivalent to
Turing machines: is it possible to design new models of computation capa-
ble of transgressing Turing’s barrier? As a response, in 1998 together with
John Casti and Michael Dinneen I started a new series of conferences called
Unconventional Models of Computation; see [12, 11]. The first conference in
the series was organised in Auckland, New Zealand on 6–9 January 1998 by
the Centre for Discrete Mathematics and Theoretical Computer Science in
Auckland and the Santa Fe Institute.
My interests for the emergent area of unconventional computing sparked
from three sources: a) my ongoing work on limits, b) the cooperation with
quantum physicist Karl Svozil4 on discrete modelling of quantum phenomena,
see [14, 15, 16, 17] and c) a “rebel” attitude against the mainstream computer
science motivated in part by the feeling that although I am part of the com-
munity,“I still do not belong”.5 Since then I have been working in trespassing
the Turing barrier [18, 19, 20, 21, 22], de-quantisation [23, 23, 24], quantum
randomness, [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30] and quantum annealing [31, 32, 33]. As
one can recognise, these topics are not “main stream”; moreover, the results
themselves are not infrequently “swimming against the tides”.
5. Selim Akl: Nonuniversality
I cannot remember a time when I did not think unconventionally. All my
life I tried to see if some things could be done differently. It was always a
thrill to explore unconventional wisdom. Since this article is about paths to
3Currently still open.
4Author of the influential book [13].
5Why such a feeling? Perhaps because of my strong interest in modelling mathemati-
cally computational processes. Mathematics is a blend of logical rigour and art, a discipline
closer to philosophy and theology than to science and engineering. Like philosophy and
theology, mathematics operates with ideas, a universe in which infinity plays a dominant
role and beauty is a major criterion of quality. Understanding is more important than
knowing or doing (computing). Although breaking barriers is the norm, mathematics is














unconventional computation, I will restrict my contribution to this topic 6.
In our never-ending quest to understand the workings of Nature, we hu-
mans began with the biological cell as a good first place to look for clues.
Later, we went down to the molecule, and then further down to the atom, in
hopes of unravelling the mysteries of Nature. It is my belief that the most
essential constituent of the Universe is the bit, the unit of information and
computation. Not the cell, not the molecule, not the atom, but the bit may
very well be the ultimate key to reading Nature’s mind.
Does Nature compute? Indeed, we can model all the processes of Nature
as information processes. For example, cell multiplication and DNA replica-
tion are seen as instances of text processing. A chemical reaction is simply
an exchange of electrons, that is, an exchange of information between two
molecules. The spin of an atom, whether spin up or spin down, is a binary
process, the answer to a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ question. Information and computation
are present in all natural occurrences, from the simplest to the most complex.
From reproduction in ciliates to quorum sensing in bacterial colonies, from
respiration and photosynthesis in plants to the migration of birds and but-
terflies, and from morphogenesis to foraging for food, all the way to human
cognition, Nature appears to be continually processing information.
I had been working on parallel computation since the late 1970s. Be-
cause parallelism is inherent to all computational paradigms that later came
to be known as “unconventional”, the transition from architecture-dependent
parallelism to substrate-dependent parallelism was logical, natural, and easy.
This is how I embraced quantum computing, optical computing, bio-molecular
computing, cellular automata, slime mould computing, unconventional com-
putational problems, and ultimately nonuniversality in computation. My
earliest contribution in this direction was made in the early 1990s, when
I developed, with Dr. Sandy Pavel, processor arrays with reconfigurable
optical networks for such computations as integer sorting and the Hough
transform.
Quantum computers are usually promoted as being able to quickly per-
form computations that are otherwise infeasible on classical computers (such
as factoring large numbers). My work with Dr. Marius Nagy and Dr. Naya
Nagy, by contrast, has uncovered computations for which a quantum com-















puter is, in principle, more powerful than any conventional computer. One
example of such a computation is that of distinguishing among the 2n entan-
gled states of a quantum system of n qubits: This computation can only be
performed on a quantum computer.
With Dr. Virginia Walker, I co-supervised three graduate students who
built a DNA computer capable of performing a simple form of cryptanalysis.
They also put to the test the idea of double encoding as an approach to
resisting error accumulation in molecular biology techniques such as ligation,
gel electrophoresis, polymerase chain reaction (PCR), and graduated PCR.
With Dr. Sami Torbey I used the two-dimensional cellular automaton
model to provide unconventional solutions to computational problems that
had remained open for some time, namely: (i) Density classification, that is,
given a two-state grid, does it contain more black or more white cells? (ii)
Planar convex hull, that is, given a set of n points, what is the convex polygon
with the smallest possible area containing all of them? The first problem
was solved using a “gravity automaton”, that is, one where black cells are
programmed to “fall” down towards the bottom of the grid, while the second
was solved by programming the cells to simulate a rubber band stretched
around the point set and then released. We also used cellular automata to
solve a coverage problem for mobile sensor networks, thus bringing together
for the first time two unconventional computational models.
One of the dogmas in Computer Science is the concept of computational
universality: “Given enough time and space, any general-purpose computer
can, through simulation, perform any computation that is possible on any
other general-purpose computer.” Statements such as this are commonplace
in the computer science literature, and are served as standard fare in under-
graduate and graduate courses alike. I consider it one of my most important
contributions to have shown that such a Universal Computer cannot exist.
I discovered nonuniversality because of a challenge. While giving an in-
vited talk on parallel algorithms, a member of the audience kept heckling me
by repeatedly interrupting to say that anything I can do in parallel he can do
sequentially (on the Turing Machine, to be precise). This got me thinking:
Are there computations that can be done in parallel, but not sequentially?
It was not long before I found several such computations. The bigger insight
came when I realised that I had discovered more than I had set out to find.
Each of these computations had the following property: For a problem of size
n they could be solved by a computer capable of n elementary operations per














solved by a computer capable of fewer than n elementary operations per time
unit. This contradicted the aforementioned principle of simulation, and as
a consequence also contradicted the principle of computational universality.
Thus parallelism was sufficient to establish nonuniversality in computation. I
later proved that parallelism was also necessary for any computer that aspires
to be universal.
Specifically, in order to obtain my result on nonuniversality in compu-
tation, I exhibited functions of n variables that are easily evaluated on a
computer capable of n elementary operations per time unit, performed in
parallel, but cannot be evaluated on a computer capable of fewer than n el-
ementary operations per time unit, regardless of how much time and space
the latter is given. An example of such a function is one that takes as input
n distinct integers in arbitrary order, and returns these integers sorted in
increasing order, such that at no time during the computation three inputs
appear in decreasing order. Nonuniversality in computation is the computer
science equivalent of Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem in mathematical logic.
And thus the loop was closed. My journey had taken me from paral-
lelism to unconventional computation, and from unconventional computa-
tional problems to nonuniversality. Now, nonuniversality has brought me
back to unconventional computation. All said, I trust that unconventional
computation has provided a perfect research home for my character and my
way of thinking, and has uncovered a wondrous world of opportunities for
my inventiveness and creativity.
It is relevant to mention in closing that the motto of my academic de-
partment is Sum ergo computo, which means I am therefore I compute. The
motto speaks at different levels. At one level, it expresses our identity. The
motto says that we are computer scientists. Computing is what we do. Our
professional reason for being is the theory and practice of Computing. It also
says that virtually every activity in the world in which we live is run by a
computer, in our homes, our offices, our factories, our hospitals, our places
of entertainment and education, our means of transportation and communi-
cation, all. Just by the simple fact of living in this society, we are always
computing. At a deeper level the motto asserts that “Being is computing”.
In these three words is encapsulated our vision, and perhaps more concretely
our model of computing in Nature. To be precise, from our perspective as
humans seeking to comprehend the natural world around us, the motto says
that computing permeates the Universe and drives it: Every atom, every














a computation. To be is to compute.
What a magnificent time to be a computer scientist! Computing is the
most influential science of our time. Its applications in every walk of life are
making the world a better place in which to live. Unconventional computa-
tion offers a wealth of uncharted territories to be explored. Indeed, natural
computing may hold the key to the meaning of life itself. What more can we
hope for?
6. Hector Zenil: Causality in complexity
The line between unconventionality, dogmatism, indeed even esotericism
is very fine and critical, even in science. Turing, for example, challenged his
own concept, and came up with the idea of an oracle machine to explore
the implications of his challenge, though he never suggested that such a
machine existed. He continued challenging conceptions with his ideas about
thinking machines and processes in biology that could be closely simulated by
mathematical equations, yet never suggested that machines could (or could
not) think as humans do, which is why he designed a pragmatic test. Nor
did he ever suggest that biology followed differential equations. Einstein, in
turn, kept looking for ways to unify his gravitational and quantum models
of the world, kept challenging the idea of the need for true randomness in
quantum mechanics, but fell short of challenging the idea of a static (non-
expanding) universe. Successful theories cannot, however, remain forever
unconventional, but people can.
My first unconventional moment, of a weak type, came when I faced the
philosophical conundrum regarding the practice and the theory of compu-
tation: could the kind of mechanical description introduced by Turing be
generalized not only to the way in which humans (and now digital comput-
ers) perform calculations but to the way in which the universe operates?
Contrary to what many may think, this is not an unconventional notion;
physics points in the direction of a Turing-universe, where elementary parti-
cles cannot be further reduced in size or type. Such particles have no other
particularity to them, no distinctive properties; they are exactly alike (except
for its spin), indistinguishable, just as cells on a Turing machine tape are in-
distinguishable except in terms of the symbol they may contain (equivalent
to reading the spin direction). Moreover, classical mechanics prescribes full














true indeterministic randomness is contested by different interpretations (e.g.
Everett’s multiverse).
Every model in physics is computational and lives in the computational
universe [34] (the universe of all possible programs), as we are able to code
such models in a digital computer, plug in some data as initial conditions and
run them to generate a set of possible outcomes for real physical phenomena
with staggering predictive precision. That does not mean that the universe
itself is computational, but the correspondence between nature and such
computational models has been striking and is at the foundations of science.
Such a convergence between simulation and simulated cannot but suggest the
possibility that the real phenomenon undertakes similar calculations as the
ones carried out by the computers on which the simulation takes place. We
may be pushed to believe that the inadequacy of such models in predicting
long term weather patterns with absolute precision reflects the limitations of
the models themselves, or the divergent nature of the universe with respect
to the possibly limited digital carries, or else the fundamental unsoundness
of computable models, but we know that the most salient limitation has been
the inadequate data–both in quantitative and qualitative terms–that we can
plug into the model, as we are always limited in our ability to collect data
from open environments, from which we can never attain enough precision
without having to simulate every particle in the entire universe, an impossible
feat. But we do know that the more data we introduce into our models
the better they perform so we have indications of convergence rather than
divergence from algorithmic models of the world beyond the limitations of
measurement related to non-linear systems.
Computational or not, if anything was clear and not in the least uncon-
ventional, it was that the universe was algorithmic in a fundamental way, or
at least that in light of successful scientific practice it seemed highly likely to
be so. While this is a highly conventional point of view, many may view such
a claim as being almost as strong as its mechanistic counterpart because, ul-
timately, in order to shift the question from computation to algorithms, one
must decide what kind of computer runs the algorithms. However, after my
exploration of non-computable models of computation [35], I began my ex-
ploration of what I call the algorithmic nature of the world, which makes
no ontological commitment to some particular specs of a particular kind of
computer or of computation. I wanted to study how random the world may
be, and what the theory of mathematical randomness may tell us about the














els, their initial conditions, and the noise attendant upon the plugging in of
the data. This promised to give me a better understanding of whether it
was the nature of the data on which a computational model ran that made
it weaker and more limited, or whether it was only the quantity of the data
that determined the limitations of computable models. And so I launched
out on my strong unconventional path by introducing alternatives for mea-
suring and applying algorithmic complexity, leading to exciting deployments
of highly abstract theory in highly applied areas. The basic units of study
in the theory of algorithmic complexity are sequences, and nothing epito-
mizes a natural sequence better than the DNA. Because most information
is in the connections among genes and not the genes themselves, I defined a
concept of the graph algorithmic complexity of both labelled and unlabelled
graphs [36, 37]. However, this could not have been done if I had proceeded
by using lossless compression as others have [38, 39]. Instead I used a novel
approach based upon algorithmic probability [40, 41] that allowed me to
circumvent some of the most serious limitations of compression algorithms.
What I used was the theory of algorithmic probability [40, 41], a theory
that elegantly reconnects computation to classical probability in a proper
way through a theorem called the algorithmic coding theorem, which for its
part establishes that the most frequent outcome of a causal/deterministic
system will also be the most simple in the sense of algorithmic complexity.
When I started these approaches I was often discouraged, as I still some-
times am, and tempted to turn away from algorithmic complexity because
‘its uncomputabilty ’ (the reviewers said), that there is no algorithm to run
a computation in every case and expect the result of the algorithmic com-
plexity of an object, because the computation may or may not end. But if
we were scared away by uncomputability we would never code anything but
trivial software.
Once I had the tools, methods and an unbreakable will, I wanted to know
to what extent the world really ran on a universal mechanical computer, and
I came up with measures of algorithmicity [42, 43]: how much the outcome of
a process resembles the way in which outcomes would be sorted according to
the universal distribution, and of programmability [44, 45, 46, 47]: how much
such a process can be reprogrammed at will. The more reprogrammable,
the more causal, given that a random object cannot be reprogrammed in
any practical way other than by changing every possible bit. My colleagues,
leading biological and cognitive labs, and I have looked at how the empirical














sorts of challenges [36, 37, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53] to help with the problem
of data collection to generate a sound computational framework for model
generation.
When one takes seriously the dictum that the world is algorithmic, one
can begin to see seemingly unrelated natural phenomena from such a perspec-
tive and devise software engineering approaches to areas such as the study
of human diseases [54].
It turns out that the world may be more reprogrammable than we ex-
pected. By following a Bayesian approach to proving universal computa-
tion [55, 56], we recently showed that class boundaries that seemingly de-
termined the behaviour of computer programs could easily be transcended,
and that even the simplest of programs could be reprogrammed to simulate
computer programs of arbitrary complexity. This unconventional approach
to universality, thinking outside the box, shows that, after the impossibility
results of Turing, Chaitin or Martin-Löf, proof can no longer be at the core
of some parts of theoretical computer science, and that a scientific approach
based on experimental mathematics is required to answer certain questions,
such as how pervasive Turing-universality is in the computational universe.
We need more daring, unconventional thinkers who would stop fearing un-
computability and carry out this fruitful programme.
While unconventional computing is about challenging some computa-
tional limits, the limits I challenge are those imposed by axiomatic frame-
works and their quest for only mathematical proofs of ever-increasing ab-
straction. I rather take proofs from mature mathematical areas to seek for
their meaning in disparate areas of science, thereby establishing unconven-
tional bridges across conventional fields.
7. Andrew Schumann: Protein Monsters
One of the recent directions in unconventional computing is represented
by any biological activity controlled by placing attractants and repellents –
some items which are programmed to attract and repel the behaviour. First
of all, it is a swarm computing, considering any swarm as a computation
medium, because the behaviour of any swarm can be programmed by the
localisation of attractants presented as food pieces and repellents presented
as dangerous places. Nevertheless, we can program the behaviour of many














or plasmodia of Physarum plycephalum. On the level of one cell, this control-
ling is explained by the appearance and disappearance of actin filaments or
F-actin. Actin filaments are connected to the plasma membrane to provide
a mechanical support by an actin cortex. If there is an attractant before the
cell, actin filaments form a wave to change the cell shape to allow the move-
ment of the cell surface to build a pseudopodium by cross-linked filaments
to catch the attractant. If there is a repellent before the cell, actin filaments
form a wave to change the cell shape to avoid the repellent.
In swarm computing we use real organisms like ants or slime mould with
completely controlling their behaviour. But we may expect that in the fu-
ture we can control all the chemical reactions responsible for assembling and
disassembling the actin filament networks. It means that we would have an
“artificial protein monster” whose reactions are programmed by us even at
the molecular level.
Conventionally, any device for computations has been regarded as a “me-
chanical” calculator – a machine designed from inanimate-nature objects and
used to perform automatically all the computations in the way of mechanical
(later electronic) simulations of calculating processes. The first calculating
machine was designed by Blaise Pascal (1623 – 1662) to mechanise calcula-
tions. This attempt gave many inspirations for some logicians at that time.
So, Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz (1646 – 1716) introduced the idea of char-
acteristica universalis – the universal computer to mechanise all thinking
processes, not only calculations.
Nobody has thought of building up computers from the animate nature.
Later, the Leibniz’s idea of characteristica universalis was theoretically expli-
cated concurrently in the three ways: (i) mathematically by Kurt Friedrich
Gödel (1906 – 1978) – the idea of µ-recursive functions; (ii) from the point of
view of programming by Alonzo Church (1903 – 1995) – λ-calculus; and (iii)
from the point of view of engineering by Alan Mathison Turing (1912 – 1954)
– Turing machines. (i) Gödel’s µ-recursive functions are defined by induc-
tive sets. Now, there is a notion of the so-called corecursive functions defined
by coinductive sets to formally describe any behaviour, even not-algorithmic.
(ii) The Church’s λ-calculus can be replaced by process calculi like π-calculus
applying corecursuive functions for programming instead of recursive func-
tions. These new calculi are used for simulating different behavioural systems
including not-algorithmic and concurrent. (iii) A Turing machine is inani-
mate in principle. In unconventional computing, designing computers from














tempt to explain the animal behaviour as such and this attempt is parallel to
mathematical theories on corecursive functions and programming languages
involving process calculi.
Thus, conventionally there was a philosophical presupposition that the
human being is unique who possesses intelligence and all computers can be
made just as mechanical (electric) devices simulating the human algorithmic
thinking.
However, there is an old tradition of panpsychism – a view that all ani-
mate things bear a mind or a mind-like quality, too. So, Johann Wolfgang
von Goethe (1749 – 1832) stated that nothing exists without an internal
intelligence called by him Seele (spirit).
The panpsychistic idea of internal intelligence of all things is well ex-
pressed in Qaballah, the Judaic mysticism. The Bible verse ‘And the spirit
of God moved upon the face of the waters’ (Genesis 1:2) was interpreted
as affirming that there exists a spirit (ruah. , (רוח! of the Messiah or a pure
man before the world creation (Genesis Rabbah 8:1). This spirit is named
’Adam Qadmon (!Nקדמו Mאד). He is the cosmic man or Self and represents
‘crown’ (keter, ,(כתר! the divine will to create everything. From ’Adam Qad-
mon emerge the following four worlds: (i) the divine light or pure emanation
(’az. ilut, ;(אצילות! (ii) the creation or divine waters (briy’ah, ;(בריאה! (iii) the
formation or internal essence of all things (yez. irah, ;(יצירה! and (iv) the action
and all the forms of behavior (‘aśiyah, .(עשיה!
We find out almost the same description of internal intelligence of all
things in the Hindu tradition, as well. The cosmic man or Self is named
Purus.a and from him emerge also the same four worlds: (i) the divine light
or pure emanation (‘the Agni [A.Sch.: divine fire] whose fuel is the sun’); (ii)
the creation or divine waters (‘parjánya’ or ‘clouds whose fuel is the moon’);
(iii) the formation or internal essence of all things (contained in ‘medicinal
plant’); and (iv) the action and all the forms of behaviour (actions started
from ‘the male which sheds the semen on woman’) (Mun. d. aka Upanis.ad 2,
1:5; Tr. by S. Sitarama Sastri).
It is quite mysterious why in Judaism and Hinduism (the religions, not
connected at all between themselves) there are the similar notions of cosmic
men ’Adam Qadmon and Purus.a with the same four emanations from them.
Hence, according to some religious traditions, such as Judaism and Hin-
duism, panpsychism holds indeed – it is assumed that intelligence is every-
where. Therefore, their believers suppose that there are many non-human














In accordance with panpsychism, each animate thing is a kind of com-
puter. So, an “artificial protein monster” (Golem in Qabbalah) is possible,
too. The panpsychist idea cannot be scientific because of its religious roots,
but it can be inspiriting for us. It is so surprising that in swarm comput-
ing there are some evidences supporting panpsychism. We know that in the
neural networks there are the following two mechanisms responsible for per-
ceiving signals: (i) increasing the intensity of the signal by lateral inhibition,
when inhibitory interneurons inhibit neighbouring cells in the neural network
to make the contrast of the signal more visible; (ii) decreasing the intensity of
the signal by lateral activation, when activation interneurons activate neigh-
bouring cells to make the contrast of the signal less visible. Due to both
mechanisms, we deal with some illusions such as the Müller-Lyer one – a
geometric illusion in which the perceived length of a line depends on whether
the line terminates in an arrow tail (when we face the lateral inhibition effect)
or arrowhead (the lateral activation effect).
Hence, the lateral inhibition and lateral activation are two mechanisms
of our mind in perceiving signals (in the case of the Müller-Lyer illusion
the signals are visual). Nevertheless, the same mechanisms of transmitting
signals are discovered (i) on the level of Amoeboid organisms and (ii) on the
level of swarms optimising their transport networks. The matter is that both
effects are basic for the actin filament networks: (i) among actin filaments,
neighbouring bundles can be inhibited to increase the intensity of the signal to
make just one zone of actin filament polymerisation active; (ii) neighbouring
bundles can be activated to decrease the intensity of the signal to make
several zones of actin filament polymerisation active.
Thus, the lateral inhibition and lateral activation can be detected in
any forms of swarm networking including social bacteria and plasmodia of
Physarum polycephalum. The same effects are observed even in the swarm
behaviour of alcohol-dependent people [57], i.e. on the level of collective pat-
terns of the human beings. It means that on the level of actin filament
networks we have a kind of intelligence that is enough for the adaptation
and optimisation of logistics. So, the “artificial protein monster” (Golem)
consisting of actin filament networks and solving many computational tasks
connected to orientation and locomotion is absolutely real. The basic logic
for this monster is proposed in [58], [59], [57].
To sum up, panpsychism in computer science means that we design bio-
inspired robots by assuming scale-invariant mechanisms that have been con-














are ubiquitous events that occur over many scales including within the cell
during cell polarization, between groups of neuron within the visual cortex
to process visual cues, and between active zones of swarms to react to their
environments.
8. Zoran Konkoli: Following heart
My path to unconventional computation has been a long one. I’ve noticed
that when asked “What sort of research do you do?” most of my fellow col-
leagues have a prepared answer, but I have always had a problem explaining
that. If forced to make a quick statement, I say “I am a physicists with very
broad interests” but it is not that simple. Wondering about “mechanics” of
nature I finished my undergraduate studies in Physics at Zagreb University
(1991). Curious about why chemistry is regular earned me a doctoral de-
gree in the field of Quantum Chemistry at Gothenburg University in 1996.
Further musings on whether one can have a theory without details brought
me into Statistical Physics. I learned the tricks of trade during three post-
docs (1996-2002). In particular, under the influence of John Hertz I came to
appreciate two topics, Biological Physics and neural networks, and I slowly
moved towards Biological Physics during 2002-2006, and ultimately Theoret-
ical Cell Biology from 2006. I ought to say that I did not turn intentionally to
unconventional computation. It had been an intellectual hobby that slowly
turned into both a passion and a profession. In the following I will pose
several questions that pulled me into the field.
Computation exists but it cannot be touched: I still have a vivid picture
in my mind when I was shown a set of punch cards and been told that
they represent a computer program. There was this wonderful insight of the
connection between the physical and the metaphysical: one can touch the
machine doing a computation, but one cannot touch the computation per se,
and yet it exists. Thus a question:
What is computation? (1)
Initially, when I started thinking about it, I was not even sure which type
of science could answer such a question. I was ages away from the Church-
Turing thesis. It took me a long time to understand what it all meant.
Seems the whole world can compute: As I was studying molecular cell














of living cells. This motivated me to search for the literature where chemical
reactions are studied for computing purposes. Of course, it is hard to miss
Adleman’s work. But, in addition, I came across a wonderful series of pa-
pers by M. Konrad [60] on reaction-diffusion neuron, and a book co-edited
by him on molecular computation [61]. The way chemicals systems realize
computation is very different from the way CMOS technology is used. Thus
after this insight that it does not have to be CMOS, I wondered about the
following question:
If a living cell can compute, who else can, and why? (2)
I will make a huge leap and talk briefly about Putnam’s work on the
thesis of computational sufficiency. Hilary Putnam presented a beautiful
construct of turning any object into a finite state input/output automaton
(sort of a simple computer) [62]. Putnam argued that the ability to compute
does not define mind since even a rock has an intrinsic potential to perform
any computation. By copying Putnam’s argument, a much deeper version of
question (1) might be:
Since it seems that the whole world can compute, what
does it mean to compute then? For example, is compu-
tation accidental (something that just exists) or essential
(something that exists for a reason)?
(3)
In very rough terms my interest in unconventional computation interpolates
between (2) and (3), and in the next subsection I shall discuss some topics
that span this range.
Some selected questions on unconventional computation: There are sev-
eral ways to rephrase question (3) so that it becomes more specific.
Given a physical object, what can it compute? (4)
I have learned that the question above is normally referred to as the imple-
mentation problem [62, 63]. Indeed, in unconventional computation we often
ask that question. For someone with a background in dynamical systems,
and with the interest in computation, a natural question to ask is:
Given a dynamical system, what can it compute? (5)
Putnam’s construct provides a surprising answer to both of these, as ex-
plained earlier. My own contribution to understanding these questions, was














Putnam’s construct has been attacked with the argument that the amount
of auxiliary equipment needed to turn a rock into a computer would be
unreasonably large. I’ve managed build a skeleton of a theory that could
formalize this issue. While applying the theory (as thought experiments) to
several systems (including the rock), to my great surprise, I realized that
question (5) does not really makes sense from a rigorous mathematical point
of view. However, question (6) does:
Given a dynamical system, what can it compute natu-
rally?
(6)
For obvious reasons I refer to question (6) as the natural implementation
problem. The key insight is that there is a balance between (a) the computa-
tion that comes out of the system, and (b) the cost of implementing it, and
there is a tipping point, where (b) overpowers (a). This point defines the
computation naturally implemented by a system.
A challenge to my younger self: Regarding the belief that there is a
dynamical system theory for everything: I would like to posit that this might
not be the case.
Are there objects or phenomena around us that we cannot
model as dynamical system? If yes, what is the right
theory for these systems?
(7)
It is possible that the answer to the above question is “no”. Every dy-
namic behavior represents a computation. But, there are computational
problems that cannot be solved algorithmically, and accordingly cannot be
represented as a dynamical system. Assuming that the computation per se
is something real, then there might be real objects we do not have a dy-
namical theory for. The question whether the computation is something
abstract (a way to think about the reality) or real (an object one can touch)
links the computability and the dynamical system concepts in a peculiar way.
Thus, I posit that without understanding the generic dynamical systems -
computation interplay we shall never be able to exploit the full horizon of
unconventional computation. Further, I wonder whether the model of com-
putation construct has its limits but we are only still not reaching these.
Finally, I wonder whether we are ultimately justified in separating the idea














9. Maurice Margenstern: Hyperbolic computation
What are the philosophical, even religious bases of my researches? There
are no religious foundation of theses researches as I am an atheist. I was
born in a Jewish family but, when my father was rather religious, my mother
was not at all, clothing her non-believing with Jewish humour. However,
I received a minimal heritage of Jewish tradition making me eager to read
the bible. I did that several times, especially the Old Testament. I also
read the new one, noticing that it is a completely different story, despite the
many references to the Old Scripture in the Gospels. In the bible, I like
especially Genesis, Exodus, Job’s book, Ecclesiastes and the Song of songs,
this marvellous love poem.
To my eyes, the story described at the beginning of Genesis and the Big-
Bang theory of modern physics look very similar and their scientific validity
is that of White Snow and the Seven Dwarfs. We know reality by a few
parameters. What our eyes can see is a very small window of the light spec-
trum. I think that reality is so rich that a few equations cannot handle it.
The equations of our physics are simply approximations of reality. Conse-
quently, I do not subscribe to the idea that reality is utterly mathematics.
Why? The latter idea is based on a vision of nature sciences as embedded in
the following order: maths contain physics which contains chemistry which
contains biology. I do not think that this embedding is correct. If it were, let
us go on that embedding chain. Thus, biology contains ethology which con-
tains sociology which contains psychology whose laws describe literature and
arts. Nobody believes in that latter sentence. I think the just mentioned
chain is false from the very beginning. Nobody knows in which geometry
does our universe live. It is funny to notice that NASA desperately wishes
that we live in a Euclidean space, arguing that some constant should be null.
But that a real number is exactly null is precisely something that no algo-
rithm can check. So that if the whole universe would be Euclidean, we could
never be sure of that. Now, it seems that some parts of our solar system,
especially around the sun, is not very much Euclidean. To sum up: if we do
not know what the geometry of our universe is, how can we be sure that the
extent of the physical laws we presently know is global? Another argument
is the theory of multiverse whose morale is extremely strange: if it would be
true, certainly science cannot predict anything as any prediction does occur
in some universe so that we do not know the next universe in which we live














In my young studies, I especially liked maths and drawing. As what I
did in math classes was much better than my artistic achievements, I turned
to math which also satisfied my aesthetically thirst. In maths, I preferred
geometry, where I liked both pictures and proofs, two kinds of beauties very
different from each other but which I both highly appreciated. By the way,
the notion of beauty might indicate us something that escapes standard
formalism, although formalism itself may contain a kind of beauty too. Well,
for what is usually called beauty, we feel it, we cannot define it. Probably,
my turn to maths has something to do with both my non-believing and
my feelings to beauty, especially graphical beauty. Up to my thirties, I
thought that maths might explain everything. I now know that it is not
true, unfortunately, although maths much help us to understand the world.
I think theoretical computer science might help us more than maths: in
theoretical computer science, models are taken from wider parts of reality
than in maths. In particular, computer science models might be more useful
for biology than partial differential equations.
My research in the field of cellular automata in hyperbolic spaces came
from my fascination to hyperbolic geometry. When I was around 27, among
my teachings I had lectures in a school which formed future primary school
female teachers, as at that time, in France, there were such schools for men
and women separately. Before those lectures, I came upon Meschkowski’s
small book introducing to hyperbolic geometry. The book is a fascinating in-
troduction to that field. The book gave me an answer to an old question from
the time of the public school. We had there rather evolved lectures about ge-
ometry, of course, Euclidean geometry. Our lectures about inversion were so
elegant that I thought that something was behind, a something about which
our teachers were silent. Meschkowski’s book gave me the answer: inversion
is the tool which allowed Poincaré to model reflection in his disc model of
hyperbolic geometry in the plane. Accordingly, in that school I introduced
my audience of young ladies to hyperbolic geometry. They were fascinated as
I was, but they told me with charming smiles that they understood nothing
to these beautiful features I described them.
Life decided that I would return to the subject more than twenty years
later, when I was already professor in computer science at the university of
Metz. In my books about cellular automata in hyperbolic spaces, I told how
I came to that topic. Notice that the initial goal, to devise reversible cellular
automata in hyperbolic spaces, was never reached. However, I met something














the aesthetic of the figures I used in my research, several referees seemed to
share my impression, was of great help. Colours played an important role to
grasp the main features of a situation. The aesthetic of the figures was an
important motivation to go further.
Another part of my research was raised by finding the border between
universality and decidability. Universality means the ability to compute
anything which is algorithmically computable. Now, universality entails un-
decidable problems, which means problems which cannot be solved by any
algorithm. That latter situation can be interpreted as a too general specifi-
cation of the problem. So that if your specification allows you to program a
universal device, it means that the specification is not complete. Now, it is
possible to program universal devises with small resources. The complexity
of viruses are much higher than the complexity of the small universal devices
known in computer science. Therapeutic means can be compared to algo-
rithms which decide when the device halts. As the device is universal, such
an algorithm cannot exist. This is why the race for more and more efficient
antibiotics is hopeless. Viruses and bacterias can be fought by viruses and
bacteria only: it is urgent to change the medical strategy.
Now, we should not be pessimistic. Real life shows us that technology,
which could not exist without science, is, up to some point, efficient, ignoring
here ethical aspects of the issue, so that we do know something and, even,
we know more and more although we know that there are a lot of problems
which are still unsolved even if some of them are ill posed, a situation which
may occur even if we ignore it at the present moment.
That latter point has a link with religion. If we believe in God, no prob-
lem, God explains all that we do not know, which does not bring us more
concrete knowledge. For me, the assertion that maths are the ultimate re-
ality is exactly of the same kind. That assertion fixes a frame in which,
theoretically, we can solve any question, so that we are, intellectually more
comfortable. Although I think that material comfort gives better conditions
to scientists to make discoveries and to solve problems, I think that “com-
fortable” views are dangerous in science. They make us forget that doubt is
the main tool which allows us to step forward in our endless search of more
and more knowledge about the world in which we live, in the spaces, in which














10. José Félix Costa: Real numbers in computation
This is a short account on how the study of physical measurements guided
us into unconventional computation.
If one wonders why the real numbers come into the natural sciences, the
most common answer is to say that reality is easier to model and forecast in
the continuum, mainly due to the success and the development of Calculus.
Thus, when a model of Vannevar Bush’s analogue computer (by the end of
1930) was developed by Claude Shannon in [65], it resulted in a system of
differential equations of a particular kind, describing a network of mechanical
gears and integrators, where input and output were physical magnitudes
taking values in the real numbers. In analogue computation inputs are given
as initial conditions or, in the general setting of more than one dimension, as
boundary conditions. Real numbers may encode non-computable information
in different degrees, but the way they are used in Bush’s analogue computer
does not permit to decipher their potential information content and decide
the undecidable. In [66] we show that by means of discontinuous functions
and functions with discontinuous derivatives this information content can
be retrieved. But, since these functions cannot be realised exactly in the
physical world, we conclude that the real numbers have the same role in
analogue computation than they have in the physical sciences.
The next step in our journey to understand the role of real numbers in
computation was the ARNN model 7 (see [67]), a well known discrete time
computational system that computes beyond the Turing model. This feature
is common to dynamic systems that are universal and able to extract every
digit of the expansion of an internal real-valued parameter. These dynamic
systems behave like a technician improving his measurements (using better
and better equipment): they can perform a measurement of O(nk) bits of
the binary expansion of a parameter in linear time and use these sequences
of bits as advice to decide on inputs of size n. By the end of the nineties, the
ARNN became a model of what a discrete time dynamic system with real
parameters can compute in a polynomial number of steps on the size of the
input. (In one way, the fact that the weights are real numbers is not that
much conspicuous, since, as “physical” models, neural networks have been
treated since the seventies as models of cognition involving real weights (see
[68]) either in learning activities (supervised or unsupervised) or in classifi-














cation tasks.) However, the persistence of real numbers in a computational
model can be seen as the possible embedding of the information one wants
the system to extract later to help along some computation (see Martin Davis
[69, 70]). Nevertheless, the ARNN model exhibits a very interesting struc-
tural property: as the type of the weights vary from the integer numbers Z
to the rational numbers Q to the real numbers R, the computational power
of the ARNN increases from the class of regular languages to the class of
recursive languages to the class of all languages.
The real numbers can be seen as an oracle or advice to a Turing ma-
chine (to a computer). We considered in [71, 72, 73] the experimenter (e.g.
the experimental physicist) as a Turing machine and the experiment of mea-
surement (using a specified physical apparatus) as an oracle to the Turing
machine. The algorithm running in the machine abstracts the experimen-
tal method of measurement (encoding the recursive structure of experimental
actions) chosen by the experimenter. In [74, 73] we uncover three types of ex-
periments of measurement to find approximations to real numbers in Physics.
Some values can be determined by successive approximations, approaching
the unknown value by dyadic rationals above and below that value (see [75]
for a universal measurement algorithm relative to two-sided experiments).
Fundamental measurement of distance, angle, mass, etc., fall into this class.
A second type of experiment was considered, e.g., the measurement of the
threshold of a neuron in [76]. We can approach the desired value only from
below the threshold (one-sided experiments). A third type of measurement
was discussed in [77] relative to experiments where the access to the unknown
is derived from the observation of another quantity that vanishes (such like
the intensity of light in an experiment to measure some angles in Optiks).
We were not able to identify any fourth type of measurement thus far.
In 2008-9, we investigated how much the information encoded into the
reals can be retrieved by dynamic systems — the abstract technicians —,
performing a measurement, although, intuitively, we knew that, in practice, it
cannot be done beyond a few digits. We proved that Turing machines having
access to measurements can compute above the Turing limit. However, in
the controversial supposition that real numbers exist, no one knows how to
engineer such parameters into a dynamic system. It is certainly impossible
(see [69, 70]). Good bye to real number based programming! However,
natural or artificial systems involving real-valued magnitudes may not be
fully simulable. In [78], Michael Manthey questions the reader on how can














classical concept of an algorithm is a specification of a process that is to take
when the algorithm is unrolled into time. E.g., he states that “one might
compare this feature to the theory of evolution based on natural selection that
is a process-level theory for which the existence of some a priori algorithm is
problematic”. I like this idea as description of what a super-Turing process
may be. Thus, in this way, in the limit, evolution can be specified within
a (possibly non-computable) real number that encodes the process through
time. Intelligent design is then the propaganda of a super-Turing design.
Suddenly, in the beginning of 2009, we realised that the Theory of Mea-
surement (see [79, 80, 81]) did not take into account the physical time needed
for a measurement of increasing precision (as a function of precision). A con-
crete example from dynamics follows (see [72]). Let us assume that we are
about to measure inertial mass (according with Newton’s laws): if we project
a proof particle of known mass m towards a particle of unknown mass µ, then,
after the collision, the first particle will be reflected if its mass is less than
µ, and it is projected forward together with the particle of unknown mass if
its mass is greater than µ. Using linear binary search on the proof particle
we can, conceivable, read bit by bit, the value of the unknown. However, the




This means that the time needed to get the i-th bit of the mass µ, using
the proof particle of mass m of size i (number of bits) is in the best case
exponential in i! If the standard oracle to a Turing machine is to be replaced
by a physical measurement (that in a dynamic system is the ability of reading
an internal parameter into the state of the system), then the time needed
to consult the oracle is not any more a single step of computation but a
number of time steps that will depend on the size of the information that the
experimenter already got. The time complexity of a measurement reduces the
computational power of dynamic systems with self-advice from their internal
parameters. According with [82], this reduction of super-Turing capabilities
can be so great that the real numbers add no further power, even assuming
that the reals exist beyond the discrete nature of matter and energy. In
the best scenario, we are still waiting for some evidence that refutes the
following conjecture: No reasonable physical measurement has an associated
measurement map performable in polynomial time. The ARNN departs from














derivatives, e.g. not in agreement with conventional neural nets (e.g., as
those being trained by the method of backpropagation of errors). With a
more realistic (analytic) activation function of the neurons, the time to read
the next bit of a real weight is exponential in the number of bits already
extracted.
In the physical world, it is not conceivable that a particle of mass µ can
be set with infinite precision. Measurements should be regarded as informa-
tion with possible error 8 that take time to consult. The complexity classes
involved in such computations bounded in a polynomial number of steps were
fully characterised in [74, 76, 77]. In [83], we synthesized our findings stating
that in the best scenario the power of the system drops from common com-
putations having access to polynomial long advices to common computations
on help by just sublogarithmic long advices. (Moreover, the existence of ex-
tra power in any computation with or without advice can only be refuted by
an observer — being human or device — in the limit.)
It may also happen that such real values, e.g. supposedly physical con-
stants, may vary through time, adding incomputability to physical observa-
tions. This is a step further that we started considering in [84], following this
assumption of Peirce:
[Peirce [85]] Now the only possible way of accounting for the
laws of Nature and for uniformity in general is to suppose them
result of evolution. This supposes them not to be absolute, not
to be obeyed precisely. It makes an element of indeterminacy,
spontaneity, or absolute chance in nature.
11. Mark Burgin: Wushu
Unconventional computation is treated in literature as an opposition to
conventional computation. At the same time, the word unconventional means
going beyond conventional or routine. Looking for philosophical roots of this
phenomenon, it is possible to find analogous approaches to reality in the
philosophy of the great Greek philosopher Socrates and in its further devel-
opment by another great Greek philosopher Plato. According to dialogues
of Plato and other historical sources such as works of Xenophon, Socrates
often analyzes conventional concepts and ideas scrutinizing their validity and














aiming to go beyond the conventional understanding [86, 87, 88]. In his com-
munication with other people, Socrates believed his duty was to enlighten
himself and fellow-citizens on insufficiency of conventional knowledge and ne-
cessity to achieve a higher level of expertise in the pursuit of truth. Although
some philosophers thought the goal of Socrates was to demonstrate ignorance
of his interlocutors, Socrates was also trying to overcome limitations of per-
ception of words and things opening new ways for innovative insight. The
Socratic approach is a way to search for truth by one’s own lights. It is an
open system of philosophical quest, which allows one exploring the problem
from various angles and perspectives.
In a similar way, instead of requiring allegiance to the existing technology
or typical procedures, unconventional computing seeks new ways to attain the
same goals in a better manner or to do what is impossible to accomplish by
conventional means. The Socratic approach to computing asks: Does the best
computational models and topmost computing technology of our day offer
us the greatest potential for solving the diversity of problems encountered by
individuals and society as a whole? Or, may be, the prevailing computational
models and computing technology are in fact a roadblock to realizing this
potential?
Invention of inductive Turing machines, the first model of algorithms, for
which it was mathematically proved that they were more powerful than Tur-
ing machines (Burgin, 1987), gives an example of this approach. To invent
inductive Turing machines, it was necessary to go out of the box created by
Turing machines and sealed by the Church-Turing Thesis. Virtually, there
were two boxes. The first box was ideological. Living in this box, computer
scientists believed that to get a result from an algorithm, the algorithm had
to stop or in some other way to inform the user that the result of computa-
tion was already obtained. This condition is actually absent in all informal
definitions and descriptions of algorithms. Going out of this artificial box
allowed inductive Turing machines to achieve much higher power than Tur-
ing machines had [89, 90, 91]. The second box created by Turing machines
and sealed by the Church-Turing Thesis was technological. In contrast to
real computers, a Turing machine has only a processor and a control device,
while computers also have various input and output devices. The incongru-
ence of this box was so evident that it was easy to overcome this obstacle
providing an inductive Turing machine with one or several input tapes and
one or several output tapes [89, 90, 91]. This theoretical innovation ampli-















An important direction in unconventional computing is formed by study-
ing chemical, physical and living phenomena. At the same time, there is his-
torical evidence that many philosophers and other thinkers in ancient Greece
contended the concept of technology as learning from and imitating nature.
For instance, the principle of learning from nature was central in the medical
school of Hippocrates. Democritus suggested an historical evidence of tech-
nological development by imitating nature in such areas as house-building
and weaving, which were first invented by imitating swallows and spiders
building their nests and nets, respectively. According to Plato (Laws, Book
X), craftsmen imitate natures craftsmanship when they are producing arti-
facts [86]. Thus, the Western philosophical tradition supported the approach
to building systems following nature or more exactly, natural systems. The
same approach we can find in unconventional computing: conventional hard-
ware still outperforms optical and molecular computer. It is also possible
to find imitation nature approach in Eastern tradition. However, if West-
ern philosophy accentuates imitation of natural systems (material objects),
Eastern tradition concentrates on imitation of natural processes (structural
objects).
As it written by An Tianrong and Aiping Cheng in “Tradition Wushu
and Competition Wushu”9:
In the long golden river of Chinese cultural history, wushu10 is a
feature of great significance. It is broad and deep and so profound
that one cannot see its beginning or its end. It is so broad that one
cannot see its edges. Over its five-thousand-year history, it has
acquired a theoretical framework that embraces many Chinese
traditional cultures (classical philosophy, ethics, militia, regimen,
Chinese medicine, and aesthetic, etc.). Its association with Tao-
ism, Confucianism, Buddhism, and hundreds of other Chinese
philosophical systems cannot be ignored. Chinese wushu is not
only treasured for defense, physical exercise, preventing illness,
and longevity, it also best illustrates Chinese behavior, morality,
philosophy, and aesthetic expression. It mixes in a philosophy of
living and an understanding of the human condition.
9http://www.kungfudragonusa.com/wushu-concept-theories-principles-and-philosophies/














Two of the basic principles of the traditional wushu philosophy may in-
clude several versions: the doctrine of no limitation, the doctrine of a harmo-
nious whole and the doctrine of practical use. Wushu philosophy influenced
the development of the fighting styles of wushu, also called kung fu or gongfu.
One of the popular directions in wushu is formation of fighting techniques
imitating animals, reptiles and birds. For instance, the Five Animal martial
arts, which supposedly originated from the Henan Shaolin Temple, follows
behavior and actions of five living being (animals according to Chinese) -
Tiger, Crane, Leopard, Snake, and Dragon. Another selection of five animals,
which is also widely used, is the crane, the tiger, the monkey, the snake, and
the mantis. Actually, there are more than five animals, reptiles and birds,
which give birth to different fighting styles and techniques of wushu. There
are such animal styles (techniques) as the Tiger Fist (with its versions Black
Tiger Fist and Black Tiger Claw), Panther, Horse, Cobra, Bull, Wolf etc.
These styles and techniques are based on creative imitation of the actions
and behavior of the corresponding animals, reptiles and birds.
12. Andrew Adamatzky: Dissent and inclusiveness
‘Unconventional’ is “deviating from commonly accepted beliefs or prac-
tices”; synonyms of the ‘unconventional; are ‘dissentient’, ‘dissenting’, ‘dis-
sident’ [93]. My path to the unconventional is rooted in the ‘spirit of dis-
senting’. I inherited this spirit from my ancestor hieromonk Epiphanius
(Adamatzky) and my late father Igor Adamatzky. Epiphanius was famous
for his unorthodox thinking and love for science and education. In 1738
Archbishop Gabriel asked Epiphanius to close a church school for poor kids.
Epiphanius refused and continued spreading knowledge. For this he was dis-
missed from Kazan diocese and sent to Solovetsky Monastery Prison. Igor
Adamatzky was a well known dissent and writer in Soviet Union [94]. He par-
ticipated in an illegal organisation aimed to democratise the Soviet society,
was tried several times on political legal charges, and founded an organi-
sation of underground writers, artists and musicians (Club-81). His fiction
writings emphasise paradoxes of imaginary and reality and praised ideological
opposition.
The spirit of dissent led me to dream about the field of science which is
egalitarian with no social or academic hierarchies — the field where idolatry
is strongly discouraged. This is the unconventional computing: no leaders, no














expertise is fully distributed, knowledge is produced collectively. Developing
theoretical designs and experimental laboratory prototypes of unconventional
computing devices is a game. This game is based on creativity, complemen-
tarity of skills, unity of minds, and of course arts. The leads to generalised
distributed happiness and worry-free recklessness.
The unconventional computing evolved to a
society to which pre-established forms, crystallised by law, are re-
pugnant; which looks for harmony in an ever-changing and fugi-
tive equilibrium between a multitude of varied forces and influ-
ences of every kind, following their own course [95]
What is unconventional computing technically? If a new algorithm is
proposed how do we know how to call it: ‘new’, ‘advanced’ or ‘unconven-
tional’. And how unconventional ideas could emerge in human mind at all if
the mind itself is conventional? Would a calculator based on a ternary arith-
metic be considered unconventional nowadays? Yes . . . Wait, such machine
was already built by Thomas Fowler in 1840 [96]. Is quantum computing
unconventional? May be or may be not because it is quite an established
field and there are quantum computers on the market. As Tommaso Toffoli
wrote:
. . . a computing scheme that today is viewed as unconventional
may well be so because its time hasn’t come yet - or is already
gone.
Unconventional computing is a science with no direct links to either past
or future. Rather it is a science of the present and of the momentary asso-
ciation:“. . . the ever-fluid, constantly renewed association of all that exists”
[97]. The ‘Noosphere’ of unconventional computing is shapeless yet ubiqui-
tous. Unconventional computing is a science in flux. Only the present gives
us a glimpse of hope through its momentary existence.
13. Mohammad Mahdi Dehshibi: Persian philosophy
I interpret role of Eastern-Western philosophies on the shaping of un-
conventional computing through the prism of complexity of Persian lan-















Where was I? In advance to go through a study in the line of complex-
ity in Persian languages, two questions had to be answered. First of all,
how understanding the Persian philosophy could formally organise the rul-
ing mainstream of this study. In addition to, what the main relationship
between the evolution of the Persian language and philosophical thoughts is?
The term of Philosophy, literally “love of wisdom,” is the infrastructure
of critical phenomena such as existence, knowledge, values, reason, mind,
and language [99, 100]. According to the Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy,
the chronology of the subject and science of philosophy starts with the Indo-
Iranians, dating this event to 1500 BC. The interesting fact is that this science
is studied during the course of the questioning, critical discussion, rational
argument and systematic presentation. Hence, the language plays a critical
role [101].
To the human mind, symbols are cultural representations of reality. Ev-
ery culture has its own set of symbols associated with different experiences
and perceptions. Thus, as a representation, a symbol’s meaning is neither
instinctive nor automatic. Perhaps the most powerful of all human symbols
is language.
Eventually, discovering the whole affairs of the universe seems to be an ev-
erlasting progress which the pioneer philosophers created the building block
of this road, and others try to make this way smoother in a step-wise manner.
This is the scientific method of Aristotle, known as the inductive-deductive
method. This philosopher used inductions from observations to infer general
principles, deductions from those principles to check against further obser-
vations, and more cycles of induction and deduction to continue the advance
of knowledge [102]. Indeed, in a modern view, Complex Systems which cover
both mathematical and philosophical foundations of how micro-structures are
evolved through self-organization to form a complex macroscopic collection
could keep this manifestation [103, 104, 105].
Where will I be? In [98, 106, 107, 108, 109], the dynamics of the com-
plexity of Persian orthography were discovered from different perspectives
to understand how the Persian language developed over time. The Pattern
Formation paradigm in modelling Persian words, as a complex system, was
considered in which L-systems rules were used, and complexity measures of
these generative systems were calculated. We argued that irregularity of the
Persian language, as characterized by the complexity measures of L-systems
representing the words, increases over the temporal evolution of the language.














phenomena with chaotic appearances, Al-Jafr 11 and Numerology are two
examples of this science. Avicenna and Sheikh Baha’I 12 were among Iranian
scientists who knew about these sciences. While the published resources in
this branch are few, Baha wrote a book which although its central theme
was horoscope, it could bring an application for numerology, even if one
thinks about that as a sort of entertainment. In what could engage us to
think more about this application to find the way for the future work is the
process of modelling a complex system. This book contains 25 topics such as
prediction of building a house, gender of the child, benefits of a trade and the
like. Each topic is associated with a dedicated table (12 × 18) which each
entry contains a character known as Abjad. At the first look, each table
is like chaos; however, by selecting an entry and following a definite rule to
trace the whole table, some characters are selected. These characters are then
divided into two sub-categories of Odd and Even. Surprisingly enough, each
subset forms a meaningful verse. Indeed, discovering the routine of changing
a random set of characters within a chaotic table into a poetic order, can be
considered by unconventional computing methods to better model complex
systems.
14. Richard Mayne. Union of mind and body
Computing in the abstract sense we are discussing here is not a human
creation, but a word we use to relate the link between cause and effect in
the world around us. Let us not forget that binary numbers only exist in so
far as we choose an arbitrary voltage level within microelectrical circuits to
represent bits. That we call the processes that lead to the successful manip-
ulation of data (multiplication of numbers, for example) in a conventional
computer ‘computation’ but the equivalent process in a human something
else — cogitation, thought etc. — speaks of the limitations in our knowledge
of certain biological, chemical and physical phenomena. Note, however, that
both artificial and biological number manipulation are comparable in that
11Al-Jafr is mentioned in the story-line of One Thousand and One Nights and an accurate
explanation of al-Jafr is offered by Richard Francis Burton (six volumes 1886–1888).
12Sheikh Baha’I was a scholar, philosopher, architect, mathematician, and astronomer
who is well known for his outstanding contribution to some architectural and engineering
designs in Isfahan, Iran. Designing of the Manar Jonban, also known as the two shaking














they both output the same representation of data. Crucially, our current
means of describing principles of biological information processing are typi-
cally subjective, whereas in silico ‘computation’ implies a regular, repeatable
and fully-defined process. A goal of UC is to define a physical or living system
in objective terms that cannot be misinterpreted, i.e. those we are already
familiar with as ‘computing’, in order to enable a better understanding of
that system.
This begs the question as to why it is important to attempt to reduce
the functioning of beautiful, intricate systems such as live creatures to cold,
methodical absolutes. My initial interest in unconventional computing arose
through a desire to see a human body as a giant, complex computer, sim-
ply so that it could be ‘reprogrammed’ as a route towards developing novel
biomedical diagnostic tests and therapeutic agents. This is, of course, not a
new idea: many have noted the similarity of cellular systems to computing
systems, e.g. transcription and translation of genes, but to call the function-
ing of a live system ‘computation’ requires a further degree of abstraction
that a great many scientists shy away from, despite the fact that several of
progenitors of modern computing (notably, Turing and Von Neumann) de-
voted a great deal of time to using computing to better understand biology.
My initial work in UC involved that much-lauded bio-computing sub-
strate, slime mould Physarum polycephalum, the virtues of which have been
described ad nauseum in other texts (see Ref. [110]). My first research
role was essentially that of a microbiologist when I was commissioned to
load slime moulds with superparamagnetic iron oxide nanoparticles, then
study patterns of nanoparticle uptake, intracellular distribution and egress
via electron microscopy, for the purpose of making various bio-circuits (see
Ref. [111]). I was unaware at the time that this work would lead to a
profound change in my understanding of the concepts ‘mind’ and ‘body’.
This work led into my doctorate on slime mould computing during which
I became aware that, although intellectually diverting, treating a whole cell
as a single circuit component was a waste of the hardware each cell possesses:
here was an organism capable of concurrently processing input from millions
of membrane-bound and intracellular receptors, yet we were utilising it as
a mere variable resistor (albeit one that would crawl slowly over a circuit
board). It transpires that every eukaryotic cell contains a protein skeleton,
the ‘cytoskeleton’, which forms a dense, interconnected network throughout
the cell. It was originally thought that this network’s purpose was to sim-














various moving parts involved in cell motility. A growing body of evidence
has suggested more recently, however, that the cytoskeleton is involved in the
transmission of energetic events that constitute forms of cell signalling. These
involve, but are not limited to, transduction of mechanical force, conduction
of ionic waves and catalysis of propagating waves of chemical reactants in
biochemical signaling cascades. A small group of scientists had even sug-
gested that a number of emergent phenomena that occur in higher forms of
life (e.g. maintenance of memory within human brain cells) were linked to
cytoskeletal signalling processes, see [112]. This work was, to my reasoning,
technically sound but had not reached a great degree of acceptance in the
wider scientific community.
I opted to study the slime mould cytoskeleton on the basis of it being
a network that supports intracellular computation, i.e. a medium for coor-
dinating cellular input and output (sensorimotor coupling). I spent a great
deal of time visualising the P. polycephalum cytoskeleton, or more specifi-
cally, the most predominant protein present in the organism’s cytoskeleton,
actin.
Our results, in Refs. [113, 114], demonstrated that P. polycephalum ar-
ranges its actin in dense networks in its pseudopodia (growth cones), whereas
actin network topology is more diminutive in caudal regions. This is perhaps
to be expected in a tip-growing organism, but we were interested to note that
the varying interconnectedness of stress fibre networks approximated prox-
imity graph structures. This was particularly noteworthy as our research
group had already demonstrated that slime mould computation could be
achieved at the meso-scale through the organism’s ability to assume topolo-
gies approximating proximity graphs by ‘programming’ the plasmodium with
attractant and repellent gradients. Could we, then, program the organism to
assemble micro or even nanoscale circuitry into a moving graph architecture
(Kolmogorov-Uspensky Machine)?
By extension, could bio-computation performance be proportional to the
available resources, i.e. size, interconnectivity, complexity of data network
and speed of signal transduction therein? Hypothetically, this would repre-
sent a relatively simple solution to an age-old mystery. Our work on this
topic continues at the time of writing. Consider the profound implications
this ‘cytoskeletal theory of complex behaviour’ has on our understanding
of concepts such as consciousness. At the time of our first publication on
the topic, I suggested that our work was a casual refutation of Cartesian














mind consistent with one or more of the varieties of physicalism, as we had
suggested that virtually every part of an entity’s form is involved in doing
computation via measurable intracellular interactions between discrete phys-
ical quantities. Furthermore, incoming data streams could even be said to
influence the structure of of the body, meaning that the mind-body structure
is inextricably linked to an entity’s actions and environment!
15. Bruno Marchal. Computation and Eastern religion
When I was a kid, like many kids, I was terrified by the idea of death,
and like many little kids, I was fond of little animals. So when I learned
soon that some animals, like the amoebas, where so small that we can’t see
them, this excited a lot my imagination, and seemed to me to refute many
impossibility proofs based on the idea that if we can’t see a thing then it
does not exist. I discovered both an invisible world, and the relativity of the
notion of invisibility. I was taught that we can see them . . . with a microscope,
indeed.
All that excitation did not compare with my perplexing feeling when I
learned that every 24h the amoeba divides itself. That fact was very crucial
to me, as I identified myself to them. The question was: “was my lifetime
24h... or was I immortal?” My argument that an absence of a cadaver favors
the absence of death, was not convincing given that I already knew that
apparent absence does not entail non-existence. Also, I asked myself “does
the amoeba really divide itself, or does the universe or something else divide
it? Time passes, and I was lucky to be offered Watson’s book “Molecular
Biology of the Gene”, as well as the paper by Jacob and Monod, which will
provide a consistent picture of how, indeed, the amoeba (actually a bacteria)
manages to ask the universe to divide itself, solving somehow conceptually the
problem, except for the possible still obscure apparent role of chemistry and
physics. I was about deciding to be a chemist, or a biologist, but the math
teacher in high school drove my curiosity on Cantor’s theory of the infinities,
which led me to the discovery of Gödel’s theorems, and the arithmetical
self-reference, and eventually to the celebrate second recursion theorem of
Kleene. This will be like a sort of bomb in my mind, because here, it is no
more an amoeba which refers to itself relatively to a universe or universal
environment, but a word, or a number, relatively to a universal machine, and














theorem which will decide me to choose the field of Mathematics as university
studies.
With respect to Gödel’s theorems, there are three sort of mathematicians.
Those who does not care about them, those who love them, and those who
hate them, and well, I was told that Gödel was no more in fashion, and things
did not get quite well, if not not well at all, except for the official diplom.
I fell into depression, and decided to become a Chan Monk instead, stop-
ping meditation only for tea or Chinese calligraphy. I will learn classical
Chinese, and read the taoists Lao-Ze, Lie-Ze and Chuang-Ze [115], as well
as the immaterialists and materialists of India and Greece. My favorite text
was, and still is, “The question of Milinda”, which is at the heart of the
conjunction of the Eastern and Western insight [116, 117, 118].
Then a miracle occurs: some (illegal) medication worked, and took me
out of my “eastern depression”, although enriched by a radically new per-
spective, which will still take some time to develop though. I will came back
to my early interest in chemistry, then in quantum mechanics, and quantum
logic, and realize eventually that quantum mechanics without wave collapse,
like Gödel’s theorems [119], are allies to the mechanist idea. The rest will be
years of work, in a difficult environment, encouraged by the department of
applied science, and by many mathematicians and logicians, but in a unclear
opposition of some scientists who seemed both influent, and dogmatic on the
materialist issue. I will eventually succeed in defending a PhD thesis with the
main result: the necessity, when assuming digital mechanism, or computa-
tionalism, in the cognitive science, of deriving physics from arithmetic/meta-
arithmetic, together with an embryo of that derivation. The key discovery
was that, although it is impossible to define the machine’s notion of truth
and knowledge in its own language, we could still study the logic of a knowl-
edge associated to the machine by its classical definition (found in Plato’s
Theaetetus). Indeed, Gödel’s incompleteness makes “provability” behaving
like “belief”, so that “knowledge” of any particular arithmetical proposition A
can be mimicked by the “true belief” suggested by Theaetetus: (provable(A)
& A). A neoplatonist conception of physics, influenced by the greco-indian
dream argument ([120]) has to be derivable, if we assume Mechanism, from
such modal variants of provability, with the arithmetical interpretations of
the atomic propositions restricted to the Σ1-sentences—which models com-
putations, and with A weakened by consistent(A).
A wonderful theorem by Solovay will simplify the task immensely [121].














tional modal logic of the (arithmetically sound) machine for machine which
are rich enough to prove/believe sufficiently induction axioms, so that it
becomes able to get the important so-called “provable” Σ1-completeness:
p→ Bp
for p interpreted by Σ1-sentences. “B” represents Gödel’s provability pred-
icate, and “D” will represent the diamond (consistency, not-B-not). This
makes the machine somehow aware of its own Turing Universality.
Solovay proved much more, as he found a decidable logic, G*, axiomatiz-
ing the true (but not necessarily provable) arithmetical provability logic. This
gives a logic (set of formula closed for modus ponens) of the true-but-non-
provable formula of provability/consistency logic: G* \ G. That logic, and
the intensional variants provide to any sound and rich machine a “theology”,
in the greco-indian general sense, where “God” is a nickname for Truth. The
miracle here is that G* proves the extensional equivalence, and the inten-
sional dissemblance of all the intensional variants of G and G*. This remains
true when we limit the arithmetical interpretation of the atomic formula to
the Σ1-sentences. Albert Visser proved ([122]) that G1 = G + (p → Bp)
axiomatizes correctly and completely the corresponding logic of provability.
Here we have the miracle summed up by G1*:
G1*prove p↔ Bp↔ (Bp ∧ p)↔ (Bp ∧Dt)↔ (Bp ∧Dt ∧ p)
The key point is that G1, and G1* confirms this, the machine-itself,
played by G1, is not allowed to “see” (prove) any of those extensional equiv-
alences. This gives many ways for the machine to see the same arithmetical
(and Σ1) truth, from different points of view, or, as the neoplatonist named
them, the hypostases. Indeed they obeys very different logic, and they fit
nicely in a diagram which sums it all. The five modal nuances split into 8,



















The upper diamond gives, on its middle and right hand sides, the three
primary hypostases of Plotinus: V, G1*, S4Grz1, where the One, played by V,
represents the arithmetical truth (conceivable as a set of the Gödel numbers
of the true closed (Σ1)-sentences), and G1* plays the role of the Noùs (the
world of ideas), and, finally S4Grz1, the logic of provable-and-true, which
miraculously does not inherit the proof/truth, G/G*, splitting, plays the
role of the universal (first) person, or “World-Soul” (Plotinus). This notion
of subject can be shown coherent with the greco-indian dream arguments,
and is also very close to Brouwer’s mysticism [123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128].
This notion of soul, or first person view, makes the universal machine able to
defeat all complete effective reductionist theories about itself. The machine’s
soul is provably not describable by any third person description avialable to
that machine (a bit like with the notion of Truth, by Tarski theorem).
This can be used to show that no machine can know which machine she is,
or which machine supports its computation, still less which computation(s)
support(s) it, making physics into a science of the statistical interference
on the computations going through the actual (indexical) state of the ma-
chine. This gives rise to a sort of Everett-like, many-dreams, interpretation
of physics, which becomes reducible to elementary arithmetic. The key no-
tion is the first person indeterminacy. If we are machine, we are duplicable,
and we cannot predict which particular copy will instanciate our first person
experience although we can predict it will appear to be singular (assuming
Mechanism, of course). In particular, the logic of the observable and the
sensible should be given by the lower, material, hypostases, with Z1*, the
true logic of provable-and-consistent, playing the role of the material hy-
postases, and X1* (the true logic of provable-and-consistent-and-true) plays
the role of the first person sensible materiality. This has been partially con-
firmed by the fact that S4Grz1 (which is identical to S4Grz1*, they are not
distinguishable by G1*), Z1* and X1* gives rise to quantum (intuitionist)
logics. We get a transparent interpretation of Neoplatonism in arithmetic,
and Plotinus “matter” (the observable) has been shown to obey a quantum
logic. That would makes the quantum aspect of nature into a confirmation of
the classical mechanist hypothesis in cognitive science, and would lead to an
unconventional, at least with respect to the widespread Aristotelian materi-
alist belief, reversal between physics and the classical and canonical theology















16. Yaroslav D. Sergeyev: Thinking infinities and infinitesimals
unconventionally
When Prof. Adamatzky has invited me to contribute to this article dis-
cussing unconventional thinking and the roads leading scientists working with
non-traditional computational paradigms to their fields I was surprised. How-
ever, the idea to try to discover philosophical, cultural, and spiritual sources
of the unconventional computing is really original. In the following few pages
I first briefly introduce my field – Grossone Infinity Computing – and then
describe my personal road to this discovery.
In order to start let us remind an important distinction between numbers
and numerals. A numeral is a symbol (or a group of symbols) that represents
a number. A number is a concept that a numeral expresses. The same num-
ber can be represented by different numerals. For example, the symbols ‘9’,
‘nine’, ‘IIIIIIIII’, and ‘IX’ are different numerals, but they all represent the
same number. Rules used to write down numerals together with algorithms
for executing arithmetical operations form a numeral system.
It is worthwhile to mention that different numeral systems can express
different sets of numbers. For instance, Roman numeral system is not able
to express zero and negative numbers and such expressions as II – VII or
X-XI are indeterminate forms in this numeral system. As a result, before
appearing the positional numeral system and inventing zero mathematicians
were not able to create theorems involving zero and negative numbers and to
execute computations with them. Thus, numeral systems seriously bound the
possibilities of human beings to compute and developing new, more powerful
than existing ones, numeral systems can help a lot both in theory and practice
of computations.
It is interesting that there exist very weak numeral systems allowing their
users to express just a few numbers and one of them is illuminating for our
study. This numeral system is used by a tribe, Pirahã, living in Amazonia
nowadays. A study published in Science in 2004 (see [129]) describes that
these people use an extremely simple numeral system for counting: one, two,
many. For Pirahã, all quantities larger than two are just ‘many’ and such
operations as 2+2 and 2+1 give the same result, i.e., ‘many’. Using their
weak numeral system Pirahã are not able to see, for instance, numbers 3, 4,
and 5, to execute arithmetical operations with them, and, in general, to say
anything about these numbers because in their language there are neither














Notice that the result ‘many’ is not wrong. It is just inaccurate. Analo-
gously, when we observe a garden with 546 trees, then both phrases: ‘There
are 546 trees in the garden’ and ‘There are many trees in the garden’ are cor-
rect. However, the accuracy of the former phrase is higher than the accuracy
of the latter one. Thus, the introduction of a numeral system having numer-
als for expressing numbers 3 and 4 leads to a higher accuracy of computations
and allows one to distinguish results of operations 2+1 and 2+2.
In particular, the poverty of the numeral system of Pirahã leads to the
following results
‘many’ + 1 = ‘many’, ‘many’ + 2 = ‘many’,
‘many’− 1 = ‘many’, ‘many’− 2 = ‘many’, ‘many’ + ‘many’ = ‘many’
that are crucial for changing our outlook on infinity. In fact, by changing in
these relations ‘many’ with ∞ we get relations used to work with infinity in
the traditional calculus
∞+ 1 =∞, ∞+ 2 =∞, ∞− 1 =∞, ∞− 2 =∞, ∞+∞ =∞,
It should be mentioned that the astonishing numeral system of Pirahã is
not an isolated example of this way of counting. In fact, the same counting
system, one, two, many, is used by the Warlpiri people, aborigines living in
the Northern Territory of Australia (see [130]). Another Amazonian tribe
– Mundurukú (see [131]) fails in exact arithmetic with numbers larger than
5 but are able to compare and add large approximate numbers that are far
beyond their naming range. In particular, they use the words ‘some, not
many’ and ‘many, really many’ to distinguish two types of large numbers.
Their arithmetic reminds strongly the rules Cantor uses to work with count-
able and uncountable, i.e., with the numerals ℵ0 and C, respectively. For
instance, compare these two records
‘some, not many’+ ‘many, really many’ = ‘many, really many’,
ℵ0 + C = C.
This comparison suggests that our difficulty in working with infinity is
not connected to the nature of infinity but is a result of inadequate numeral














been developed to express finite quantities and they simply have no suffi-
ciently high quantity of numerals to express different infinities (and infinites-
imals). In other words, the difficulty we face is not connected to the object
of our study – infinity – but is the result of weak instruments – numeral
systems – used for our study.
The field of Grossone Infinity Computing introduced in [132, 133, 134]
allows one to look at infinities and infinitesimals in a new way and to execute
numerical computations with a variety of different infinities and infinitesimals
on the Infinity Computer patented in USA (see [135]) and other countries.
This approach proposes a numeral system that allows one to use the same
numerals in all the occasions we need infinities and infinitesimals. There are
applications in numerical solution of ordinary differential equations (see [136,
137, 138, 139]), the first Hilbert problem, Turing machines, and lexicographic
ordering (see [140, 141, 142]), hyperbolic geometry, fractals, and percolation
(see [143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148]), single and multiple criteria optimization
(see [149, 150, 151, 152]), infinite series and the Riemann zeta function (see
[153, 154, 155]), cellular automata (see [156]), etc.
The way of reasoning where the object of the study is separated from
the tool used by the investigator is very common in natural sciences where
researchers use tools to describe the object of their study and the used instru-
ment influences the results of the observations and determine their accuracy.
When a physicist uses a weak lens A and sees two black dots in his/her mi-
croscope he/she does not say: The object of the observation is two black
dots. The physicist is obliged to say: the lens used in the microscope allows
us to see two black dots and it is not possible to say anything more about the
nature of the object of the observation until we change the instrument - the
lens or the microscope itself - by a more precise one. Suppose that he/she
changes the lens and uses a stronger lens B and is able to observe that the
object of the observation is viewed as eleven (smaller) black dots. Thus, we
have two different answers: (i) the object is viewed as two dots if the lens A
is used; (ii) the object is viewed as eleven dots by applying the lens B. Both
answers are correct but with the different accuracies that depend on the lens
used for the observation.
The field of Grossone Infinity Computing looks analogously at Mathemat-
ics that studies numbers, objects that can be constructed by using numbers,
sets, etc. Numeral systems used to express numbers are among the instru-
ments of observations used by mathematicians. The powerful numeral sys-














results in Mathematics (in particular, working with infinities and infinitesi-
mals) in the same way as a good microscope gives the possibility of obtaining
more precise results in Physics.
Let us tell now the tale of discovering Grossone Infinity Computing. In
November 2002, when I was 39 years old, the Italian Government has invited
me to Italy to the prestigious position of Distinguished Professor at the Uni-
versity of Calabria, Italy. So, I have got a possibility to stop writing papers
with a high speed that is necessary to survive in the scientific jungle and
decided to look out of my field – global optimization – and to think what I
could do next in my scientific life. In the same time I have bought a flat in
a building that was in construction and decided to organize it following the
rules of feng shui in such a way that the flat and its furniture would increase
the intellectual force of its owner. I did not know whether this could help
in my research but since I had a freedom to organize my flat in any way
(including moving internal walls) I have decided to adopt this approach. In
particular, the place where the intellectual force should be the strongest was
where I have put my bed. It is interesting that due to feng shui, in order
to increase the intellect it was necessary to sacrifice some other part of the
personality and I have decided to sacrifice the emotional part (in any case, I
thought, people think that mathematicians are not able to have emotions).
I then spent several months reading various texts on open problems in
mathematics, computer science, and physics. In April 2003, in an evening,
one of my friends told me laughing by phone that it was written in my
horoscope that during that month I would invent something very interesting.
I have laughed also, went in my bed, and try to sleep. Then, being in a
border phase between wakeful and sleeping, the idea of how to count different
infinities and infinitesimals avoiding the usual paradoxes came in my mind.
I have immediately understood its importance and spent the following few
months checking the approach and developing it without almost sleeping
and eating (I have lost 8 kilograms in 4 months). Every time when I faced
a trouble I returned to my bed and was falling into a kind of a trance that
helped me to solve the difficulty.
I then have spent several years working on details and looking for applica-
tions. Many people have started to adopt this methodology in their research.
We have organized several conferences, published many papers, this research
was awarded several international awards, etc. More I work in this field, more
I am convinced that this new way of computing is in its very first stage. It














17. Karl Svozil: Why computation?
Nowadays I might be able to express my long time intuition in a cat-
egory theoretical form [157]: in short, computation and physics are both
categories linked by functors. Thereby category theory serves as a sort of
Rosetta Stone [158], making possible a translation among very similar, pos-
sibly equivalent, structures – with the functors serving as translators back
and forth between the physical and the computational universes. One may
even enlarge this picture by other categories like mathematics, and the natu-
ral transformations between the possible functors. In what follows I shall rant
about computation as a metaphysical as well as metamathematical metaphor.
At the same time, computation could also be understood as a narrative de-
signed to navigate and manipulate the impression of what we experience as
physical world.
First it should be acknowledged that, on the one hand, although concep-
tualized with paper-and-pencil operations in mind [159, p. 34], the category
of computation, as many structures invented by our minds, including math-
ematics and theology [160] or our money [161], appears to be “suspended in
free thought” – and solely grounded in our belief in it.
On the other hand, there appears to be “physical stuff out there” which
at first peek appears to be rather solid and “material.” Alas, the deeper
we have looked into it, and the better our means to spatially resolve matter
became, the more this stuff looked like an emptiness containing point parti-
cles of zero extension. Moreover, throughout the history of natural sciences,
there appears to be no convergence of “causes,” but rather a succession of
alternating narrations and (re)presentations as to why this stuff interacts:
take what we today call gravity, turning from mythology to Ptolemaian ge-
ometry to Newtonian force back to Einsteinian space-time geometry [162].
And this is a far cry from explaining why something exists at all – even if
this something might turn out to be primordial chaos, or an initial singularity
(possibly hiding other cycles of other universes).
Indeed, it can be expected that, for an embedded observer [163] in a vir-
tual reality, the computational intrinsic “phenomenology” supporting such
an agent appears just as “material,” and even “quantum complementary
like” [164], as our own universe is experienced by us. A surreal feeling is
expressed by Prospero in Shakespeare’s Tempest, claiming that “we are such
stuff as dreams are made on.” (Some [165] have therefore concluded that sci-














absurdities of our existence.) Ought we therefore not be allowed to assume
that the category subsumed under the name “physics” contains entities and
structures which are not dissimilar to computation?
Second, consider the functors which — like a function — assigns to each
entity in the physical world an entity in the computational universe. More
specifically, the Church-Turing thesis, interpreted as functor between physics
and computation, specifies that every capacity in the physical world is re-
flected by some computational, algorithmic capacity of what is known today
as a partial recursive function, or universal Turing computability. This is a
highly nontrivial claim which needs to be corroborated or falsified with every
physical capacity we discover. It is, so to say, under “permanent attack” from
physics. Although highly likely, nobody can guarantee that it will survive
the next day. To give one exotic and highly speculative example: maybe
someone eventually comes up with a clever way of building infinity machines
with some Zeno squeezed cycles. It is also interesting to note that one might
be able to resolve the seemingly contradicting claims of “information is phys-
ical” by Landauer, as well as “it from bit” by Wheeler, through perceiving
both physics and computation as categories linked by functors.
A universal computer, hooked up to a quantum random number genera-
tor (serving as an oracle for randomness) is supposed to be (relative to the
validity of orthodox quantum mechanics) a machine transcending universal
computational capacities. Claims of computational capacities beyond Tur-
ing’s universal computability may turn out to be difficult to (dis)prove. One
way might involve zero-knowledge proofs or zero-knowledge protocols; but I
am unaware of any such criterion [166]. Unfortunately, some such instances,
in particular “true randomness” or “true (in)determinism” as claimed by
quantum information theory, due to reductions to the halting and rule infer-
ence problems, are provable impossible to prove.
The converse functor, mapping entities from universal computation into
entities in the physical universe is considered unproblematic. After all, in
principle, given enough stuff, universal computers could be physically real-
ized; at least up to some finite means. These finite physical means induce
bounds on universal computability [167].
Speaking about computation might be like speaking about physics. And
any capacity of one category has to show up in the other one as well. In view
of this it is highly questionable if nonconstructive entities such as continua















Let me, in the second part, come to a sketch of the semantic aspect of the
categories compared earlier; and just how and why they could have formed.
Suppose that there exist (we do not attempt here to explain why this
should be so; for instance due to fluctuations or initial values) two regions in
space with a difference in temperature, or, more generally, energy (density).
Suppose further that there is some interface, such as empty space, or material
structure, or agent, allowing physical dissipative flows from one region into
the other, connecting these two regions. Then, as expressed by the second
law of thermodynamics [168], there will be an exchange of energy, whereby
statistically energy flows from hot to cold through the interface. So far, this
is a purely physical process.
Let us concentrate on the interface. More specifically, let us consider
a variety of interfaces, and look at their relative efficiency or “fitness” (we
are slowly entering an evolution type domain here). Undoubtedly, all things
equal, the type of interface with the highest throughput rate of energy per
time will dominate the dissipation process: it can “grab the biggest piece
of the cake.” Finding good or even optimal interfaces might be facilitated
through random mutation; thereby roaming through an abstract space of
possible interface states and configurations. The situation will become even
more dynamic if the relative magnitude of the various processes can change
over time. In particular, if a very efficient process (which needs not be the
most efficient) can self-replicate. Then a regime emerges which is dominated
by the Matthew effect [169] of compound interest: the population of the
strongest interface will increase relative to less effective interfaces by the
rate of compound interest – which is effectively exponential. This means
that the growth rates will at first look linear (and thus sustainable), but
later grow faster and faster until either all the energy is distributed or other
side conditions limit this growth. Now, if we identify certain interfaces with
biological entities we end up with a sort of biological evolution driven by
physical processes; in particular, by energy dissipation [170].
How does computation come into this picture? Actually, quite straight-
forwardly, if we are willing to continue this speculative path: systems which
compute can serve as, and even construct and produce, better interfaces for
energy dissipation than systems without algorithmics. Thus, through muta-
tion, that is trial-and-error driven by random walks through roaming con-
figurations and state space, the universe, and in particular, self-reproducing
agents and units, have learned to compute. This is, essentially, a scenario for














18. Genaro Martinez: patterns of computation
Having pre-Hispanic ancestors I have been always interested to under-
stand underlying mechanics, and spiritual reasons, in formation of patterns
by and orientation of the pyramids, and use of a heave circular monolith as
calendar showing solar phases and various astronomic phenomena.
First example can be found at the heart of Aztec culture — Tenochtit-
lan (the centre of Mexico City). There, templo mayor (main temple) has a
specific ortho orientation. Also, there is a number of pyramids in the cen-
tral and southern parts of Mexican Republic, most prominent locations are
Teotihuacan (a multi ethnic empire with a Sun and Moon pyramids), and
Chichen Itza (a cradle of Maya culture). My aspiration to understand and
simulate patterns of pyramids as dynamical systems led me to unconven-
tional computing. I focused mainly in cellular automata theory, thanks to
the influence of Prof. Harold McIntosh in the state of Puebla with whom I
discussed origins of mathematics in the world and a role of Aztec calendar
as an original concept of periodic stages and unique enumeration system.
Thus I developed my research around cellular automata representations of
patterns and enumeration of patterns as a computational problem [171, 172].
Computability in cellular automata theory is a good example where we
can unleash a power of imagination to develop non-conventional devices per-
forming recurrent computations. In our search for novel abstract forms of
computations, we find a diversity of representations, which can be interpreted
as computations. In this way, the computer science establishes a formal def-
initions to separate computation from other processes [173, 174]. Examples
include pattern formation, swarm behaviour and intelligence, slime mould
geometry, wave propagation and other non-linear spatially extended systems
[175, 176, 177].
In the unconventional computing we interpret spatio-temporal dynamics
of non-linear systems as processes in logical circuits or mathematical ma-
chines, including equivalents of Turing machine. A typical quest in the field
is the following: given a dynamical system, decide if the system could im-
plement computation or not. Of course, the interpretation depends on the
interpreter and ‘multi-origin’ background of the unconventional computists
allows us to consider a wide range of system at nano, micro and macro-
levels. The nature of computation [178, 179] or the interpretation of simple
programs [180] is to design computing processes and devices structure and














During the last decade unconventional computing evolved by expanding
a range of physical, chemical and biological substrates where conventional
computing circuits, e.g. Boolean logical gates, can be realised. I believe
the field is now entering a new phase where novel computing paradigms and
architectures, inspired by the substrates, will be developed.
19. Georgios Ch. Sirakoulis: Computing is understanding
The very first question when scientists come across to the term “uncon-
ventional computing” is what exactly the difference is compared to what we
know, we apply and we implement, so as to do and produce computation
so far. While there are many various definitions and different angles in the
topic that try usually to establish a unique connection with the perspectives
of such fascinating term, the main problem of “unconventional computing”
remains mainly a matter of interpretation and perception also arriving by
the subjectivity of the scientist(s) willing to use the term and the conceived
ideas on how to produce computation for her(their) problems and tentative
applications.
In the case of scientists arriving mainly from the electrical and com-
puter engineering field, as I do, commonly among most of us (especially
in the past years or better say in the last few decades) there was a ten-
dency of skepticism what such an exotically considered type of computing,
i.e.“unconventional computing” would be in position to deliver to the com-
puting science especially compared to the considered conventional types of
computation. However, without a firm definition of the term, scientists from
this field were usually frustrated to find common place on their background
for the application of such type of computation.
Nevertheless, due to the limitations introduced from the technology and
design of computing systems, mainly related with open problems like beyond
CMOS technology, more than Moore concept, not von-Neumann architec-
tures, just to name a few of the today’s technological and hardware related
challenges, the quest for juvenile solutions and corresponding novel types of
devices, circuits and systems became a quest of paramount need. Conse-
quently, the unconventional computing related idea, even in the case that
was differently speculated by the engineers, started to pave the way for try-
ing to find such solutions to the aforementioned, and most important to
the future, open problems, obeying a quite intriguing confrontation; that














its of controversial computing to guide and manifest the tomorrow needed
computation.
In my case, after working for many years with Cellular Automata (CAs)
as massively parallel computing complex models for the design, development
and implementation of novel computing hardware systems, I was also thrilled
by the opportunity to deliver alternative non standard computation not only
with CAs but also by using novel beyond CMOS models and devices and
non von-Neumann architectures, like memristors in crossbar arrays [181, 182,
183], by interfering with biological templates like slime mould and FPGAs
[184], by incorporating new processing info with DNA CAs [185], by thinking
of non standard logic arriving from species interactions [186], by applying
chemical computing for substituting classical Boolean CMOS gates [187], by
manipulating swarm robotics [188], by utilizing plants for logic computation
[189], etc. Such examples are and should be considered just a few of the
various and literally countless examples of unconventional computing.
Moreover, it was just some time ago, when the words of the famous
physicist Richard Feynman quoted on his blackboard (as found after his
death in February 1988) came apparently to my foreground:
. . . What I cannot create, I do not understand.
Thus, when considering what is the purpose of unconventional comput-
ing, to better paraphrase Feynman’s sentence, may I dare say: “What I
cannot compute, I do not understand”, and the idea is that unconventional
computing is meant to solve the puzzle and offer the expected solution again
and again, now and, in particular, in our future.
20. Bruce MacLennan: A philosophical path
As a philosophically inclined computer scientist, I was very interested in
problems in epistemology and the philosophy of science. Therefore in the
late 1970s I began reading its literature, attending philosophy of science con-
ferences, and eventually joined both the Philosophy of Science Society and
the History of Science Society. As a consequence, I learned the inadequacies
of logical positivism, which had been my working philosophy, and began to
appreciate the requirements for a more accurate account of human knowledge














epistemology”) that epistemology could not be developed in an a priori fash-
ion, but needed to take account of our scientific knowledge, including human
psychology and neuroscience.
About this time I read the revised edition of Hubert Dreyfus’ What Com-
puters Can’t Do (1979), which applied a phenomenological critique to sym-
bolic AI. He showed how contemporary approaches to knowledge represen-
tation and cognition were based on long-discredited epistemology and would
suffer the same limitations. His book was widely condemned by the AI
community, but much of the criticism came from ignorance (or uninformed
dismissal) of twentieth-century continental philosophy. What was often over-
looked, moreover, was that in addition to his critique, Dreyfus had made
several positive suggestions about the sorts of physical systems that might
exhibit genuine intelligence. Among the take-aways: Heidegger had impor-
tant insights into skilled behavior; most concepts are not defined by necessary
and sufficient conditions, but are more like Wittgensteinian “family resem-
blances”; cognition is more often imagistic than discursive; understanding
takes place against a background of unarticulated and largely unarticulat-
able common sense; there are many things that we understand simply by
virtue of having a body; and brains do not work like digital computers.
Since it became apparent to me that contemporary AI was built on inade-
quate theories of knowledge and cognition, I designed and taught a graduate-
level course, “Epistemology for Computer Scientists,” which surveyed West-
ern epistemology from the pre-Socratics to contemporary debates. This de-
veloped into a book Word and Flux: The Discrete and the Continuous in
Computation, Philosophy, and Psychology, which eventually became two vol-
umes. Volume 1 was titled From Pythagoras to the Digital Computer: The
Intellectual Roots of Symbolic Artificial Intelligence and traced the descent
of symbolic AI from the origins of Western philosophy to contemporary is-
sues in cognitive science, AI, and the theory of computation. Volume 2
was intended to present alternative theories of knowledge, drawing especially
from continental philosophy, including Heidegger, Polanyi (tacit knowledge),
Merleau-Ponty (phenomenology of perception), the later Wittgenstein, Jung
(archetypes), Maturana (autopoiesis), Varela (neurophenomenology), Lakoff
and Johnson (metaphorical thought), field theories in psychology (gestalt
psychology, Nalimov, Lewin, Pribram), and new theories of the embodied
mind. I also intended to explain the new foundation provided by the theory
of artificial neural networks and massively parallel analog computation, and














in general and for our understanding of the mind and of science in particular.
Unfortunately, I did not quite complete vol. 1 and barely started vol. 2, but
the background research has informed most of my work since the late 1980s.
Ars longa, vita brevis!
It became apparent that if AI were to succeed, research would have to
begin with the brain, since it clearly operated by different principles than dig-
ital computers and traditional symbolic AI. Since the latter (so called “Good
Old-Fashioned AI”) was rooted in formal logic with its (often implicit) back-
ground of assumptions, I concluded that the “new AI” that was emerging
from connectionism, neural network research, and neuroscience would require
new concepts of knowledge representation and processing [190]. In partic-
ular, massively parallel analog information representation and processing in
cortical maps inspired my research in field computation, in which informa-
tion is represented in spatially continuous distributions of continuous data
(or in discrete spatial arrays sufficiently dense to be treated as a contin-
uum) [191]. This was intended as a design for future neurocomputers with
very dense arrays of analog computational elements (which also invites op-
tical and quantum implementations), but also as a mathematical model of
cortical information processing.
As I continued to explore analog computation (more accurately termed
continuous computation), I began to see how pervasive were the ideas and
assumptions of discreteness, not only in computer science, but also in the
foundations of mathematics, logic, linguistics, and psychology. Therefore I
adopted a research strategy: wherever I found something that was discrete,
I would consider the implications of assuming instead that it was continu-
ous. Instead of taking the discrete as basic and assuming that apparently
continuous phenomena were actually discrete, I would turn it on its head,
assume the continuous was basic, and treat apparently discrete phenomena
as fundamentally continuous.
Some theorists have argued that continuous computation is not compu-
tation at all, asserting that Church and Turing defined computation, and
that’s the end of it. I have argued that, at very least, this is historically
incorrect, since it ignores analog computation, which had been as important
as digital computation. But it does raise the problem of defining computa-
tion: how is it distinguished from other physical processes? I have argued
that computation is distinguished by the fact that its function or purpose in
a larger system could, in principle, be served as well by a different physical














and therefore formal) [192].
A perennial problem is the relative “power” of unconventional computa-
tion compared to the Turing machine. Here the philosophy of science comes
to our aid, if we remember that the Turing machine is a model, and that
each model makes simplifying assumptions that are appropriate for a certain
class of questions, its frame of relevance [193]. Models give bad (inaccurate,
misleading) answers when applied outside of their frames of relevance. I have
argued that the interesting questions about many unconventional computing
paradigms are outside the frame of relevance of the Turing model, and so,
for the most part, such comparisons are meaningless and misleading.
On the one hand, we know Moore’s Law is coming to an end; on the other,
brain-scale neural computing requires millions or billions of artificial neurons.
This has been a concern of mine since I began working on neurocomputers
more then thirty years ago. We need to make (analog) computational ele-
ments that are sufficiently small, but more importantly, we need to connect
them in intricate patterns such as we find in the brain. Here again I think we
can apply some ideas from philosophy, in particular, from embodied philoso-
phy and cognitive science, which focus on the essential role that embodiment
plays in psychology. In particular, a principal purpose of cognition is to
control the physical body, and conversely the brain is able to offload some
computational processes to the physical interaction of the body with its envi-
ronment. By analogy we may define embodied computation as “computation
in which the physical realization of the computation or the physical effects
of the computation are essential to the computation” [194]. The theory of
embodied computation provides a basis for using computational principles to
design physical systems that have desired physical effects, such as the assem-
bly of complex physical structures. We have been applying this to artificial
morphogenesis, which applies the embodied computation principles of em-
bryological development to coordinate massive swarms of microscopic agents
to assemble complex physical structures.
As I look back at my career in unconventional computing, I realize that
it has been guided by philosophical ideas, questions, and methods. What is
knowledge and how is it represented in the brain? What are concepts and how
are they learned? How do we think, remember, imagine, and communicate?
What is the relation of mind and body, and how does this relate to robots and
computers? How does nature compute? What are formal processes? What is
computation? What are the limits of models? It is important to remember














had important connections with philosophy (as is apparent from the work of
Turing, Church, Gödel, von Neumann, and others, even back to Leibnitz).
Insights from philosophy are still valuable to us; they invite us to question the
assumptions of conventional computation, and they suggest new directions
for unconventional computation.
21. Susan Stepney: Three steps to Unconventional Computing
I came to UCOMP late in my career via a round-about route. I was
originally a physicist, but I decided during my post-doctoral research that
being a theoretical astrophysicist in the climate of the 1980s UK was not a
practical career plan, so I moved to industry. The computer industry in those
days was happy to employ someone with a PhD in an arcane technical sub-
ject, and some knowledge of Fortran programming (despite me never again
writing another line of Fortran). It was there that I learned my computer
science, mainly through various formal methods projects: proving correct
certain business-critical algorithms, from compilers [195, 196] to electronic
cash purse protocols [197, 198]. The mathematical modelling skills I had
absorbed as a physicist served me well in this work, but none of the other
background I had, none of the physics, none of the link to the real material
world, seemed to be relevant. Except on two occasions.
The first occasion was during the compiler proof work. We had a poten-
tial client who was very excited about the work, and was interested in us
doing something more ambitious for them, to prove the entire stack, from
compiler, through the assembler, down to microcode and chip design, so that
they could have a “fully proved system”. During the discussion, I said some-
thing along the lines of: “But of course, you can’t prove that the physical
system implements the lowest level model correctly. Proof only works for
the mathematical models, not for actual physical devices. There might be
manufacturing defects, or other problems.” Excitement deflated rapidly, and
we didn’t get that contract. (I was never very good at sales.) Along similar
lines, I recall someone at a conference saying “when you can prove that your
software works correctly when the device is dunked in liquid sodium, I will
use it for the safety interlocks on my nuclear reactor.”
The second occasion was during the electronic purse project. Our team
was proving the cash transfer protocols obeyed the security properties: no
cash made, no cash lost. Another team was working on the cryptography, and














in our proof [199]. During the development project, “side channel” attack
techniques were published. These attack crypto systems not through their
mathematical properties, but through measuring behaviours such as timing
[200] or power consumption [201] during the algorithm’s execution. The very
concept of these attacks stunned some mathematical computer scientists,
but for those of us with a physics background, it seemed perfectly natural
that “breaking the model” [202] of the physical system would lead to such
possibilities. Indeed, many safety and security issues can be considered as
the system moving outside its model, and hence moving outside the realms
of any formal proof.
So when I had the opportunity to move back into academia at the be-
ginning of the new millennium, I was primed to consider physical aspects
of computer systems, and decided to start my third career by researching
unconventional computation (UCOMP).
I start from Stan Ulam’s famous quote: using a term like non-linear
science is like referring to the bulk of zoology as the study of non-elephant
animals [203, 204]; in actuality, non-linear science forms the bulk of natural
science. So it may be with UCOMP: it may form the bulk of computer
science. However, conventional (or classical) computation (CCOMP) has had
much more effort expended, both theoretically, and in engineering computers.
Today, UCOMP is broad but (relatively) shallow, whilst CCOMP is narrow,
but incredibly deep. What would computation look like if UCOMP were
as deep as CCOMP, and there were an integrated theory combining all its
aspects? From now on, I will just refer to “computation” (when referring to
abstract models) or “computing” (when referring to the actions of physical
devices).
Computing is physical [205]. The world is physical: it comprises matter
and energy. It contains information, physically embodied in the structure
and organisation of that matter and energy. And parts of it compute: pur-
posefully manipulate and process that physically embodied information. I
have been working with colleagues on unpicking what we mean by physi-
cal computing: physical computing is the use of a physical system to predict
the outcome of an abstract evolution [206]. The “abstract evolution” is the
desired computation; the physical system is used to compute that evolution.
Is “used” by what, exactly? By the representational entity, the entity
whose purpose is determining the outcome of the abstract evolution. This
representational entity does not need to be a person, but it (almost certainly)














arbitrary exotic substrates are computing, from when they are being used
as scientific experiments to determine their computational potential, and
also to highlight the role of engineering a substrate to perform particular
computations. It allows computer science to be seen as a natural science
[208].
This broadens the definition of computing away from “whatever a Tur-
ing Machine does”. But it does not allow everything. Our view is not a
pan-computationalist one: the universe is not computing itself, rocks are not
computing arbitrary functions, because there can be no associated represen-
tational entity using them for this purpose [209]. Also, there appears to be
a deep link between the limits of what physical devices can do, and what
(quantum) Turing Machines can do. That the laws of physics constrain com-
putational power is unsurprising; that they appear to constrain it to just
what was devised mathematically is remarkable.
Some researchers buck at these constraints, however, and postulate super-
Turing computers (more efficient) or even hypercomputers (more effective).
However, investigation of these machine designs (the modern day equivalent
of perpetual motion machines?) shows that they appear to require one of two
properties of the physical world to be changed: the currently understood laws
of physics need to be changed (often back to Newtonian laws), or a physical
infinity needs to be instantiated (usually of precision or time) [210]. These
approaches seem to assume that the model exactly captures the physical
system. In side channel attacks (above), the model does not encompass the
entire physical system: it neglects features like power consumption. With
these proposals, the model is more powerful than the physical system: for
example, that the model is cast in terms of infinite precision real numbers in
no way means that any physical system supports infinite precision quantities
and measurements. So hypercomputers seem unlikely.
But hypercomputing is not the only goal of UCOMP. Examining funda-
mental differences in the assumptions behind CCOMP models and physical
systems may help in the design of UCOMP devices that can simulate certain
physical processes and complex systems more naturally [211]. Composing
a variety of unconventional substrates may also lead to better exploitation
of their diverse properties [212, 213]. Biology offers an exciting route to
UCOMP, because it is the study of evolved (as opposed to engineered) com-
plex substrates capable of information processing [207]. As well as studying
living material, it is worth studying non-living substrates that have suffi-














behaviours that might be analysed with a common model [216].
I have been looking to more complex physics, chemistry, and biology to
find new insights into computational novelty [217]. This again harks back to
the idea of “breaking the model”, and realising there is a difference between
the model and the physical system. Any sufficiently complex time-evolving
system eventually moves outside (breaks) the model we use to capture it,
new properties and function emerge, and we then must build a new model.
One challenge is how to capture such richness and model-breaking in silico:
how can a designed computational system move outside its design? Meta-
programming is a classical option [218], but UCOMP potentially holds the
key, with systems directly exploiting rich physical properties.
In summary, my take on UCOMP is that it enriches computer science
by foregrounding the embodied nature of information and computation, and
it enriches the natural sciences by foregrounding the informational and pro-
cessing abilities of complex matter.
22. Conclusion
‘The inner tangle and the outer tangle —
This generation is entangled in a tangle.
And so I ask of Gotama this question:
Who succeeds in disentangling this tangle?’
(S.i.13, Visuddhimmaga ‘The Path of Purification’ [219])
We aimed to establish links between spirituality at the intersection of
East and West cultures and our personal quests in unconventional computing.
What is unconventional computing? Answering the unanswerable? Combin-
ing the incompatible? Each one of us might define it differently. Unconven-
tional computing is: going beyond discriminative knowledge (Morita), com-
puting with endo-observers (Gunji), challenging impossibilities (Calude), in-
trinsic parallelism and nonuniversality (Akl), everywhere-intelligence (Schu-
mann), the art of paradoxes (Konkoli), harmonious wholeness of wushu (Bur-
gin), spirit of dissent (Adamatzky), order emerging from chaos (Dehshibi), in-
finity (Sergeyev), subcellular nirvana (Mayne), many dreams theology (Mar-
chal), physics of measurement (Costa), patterns of complexity (Martinez),
science of “uncomfortable” (Margenstern), continuous computation (MacLen-
nan), physical universe (Svozil), undefined computation (Sirakoulis), finding
causality in complexity (Zenil), a natural science (Stepney). Have we ad-














Eastern and West thought tradition in exploring the nature of computation?
The essays presented show that each author had different journey towards
the unconventional computing. There is no evidence that any cultural tra-
dition or religious or spiritual beliefs underly our styles of thinking. Our
spiritual worlds and styles of thinking are highly diverse and nonlinear. This
diversity of the ‘ecosystem of thoughts’ should be cherished and protected.
Is there any connection between the Eastern and Western thought traditions
as a central and leading element of scientific development? Unlikely. The
scientific world is now highly mobile and interconnected, stereotypes and
beliefs acquired by us in childhoods already disappeared and we look at the
nature of intellectual challenges through the eyes of pragmatic scientists. The
Nature is an amazing machinery, defined by laws of physics, chemistry and
biology, which leaves little place for unfounded beliefs. Why we are doing
unconventional computing? One of possible explanations could be that fac-
ing the indifference of nature to our lifes we create our own beacons of light
to travel through the darkness of unknown.
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Recent Topics in Mathematical and Computational Linguistics, Edi-
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[118] Nâgasena, Les questions de Milinda, Editions Dharma, Les Jacourets,
Peymeinade France, 1983.
[119] J. C. Webb, Mechanism, Mentalism and Metamathematics: An essay
on Finitism, D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht, Holland, 1980.
[120] W. Evans-Wentz (Ed.), Le Yoga Tibétain et les Doctrines Secrètes,
Librairie d’Amérique et d’Orient Adrien Maisonneuve, Paris, 1987,
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